THE "PUBLIC" IN PUBLIC LAND APPEALS: A CASE
STUDY IN "REFORMED" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROPOSAL FOR ORDERLY PARTICIPATION
Marla E. Mansfield*

I. INTRODUCTION

The term "public lands" has a specific legal meaning but nevertheless evokes a picture of unfenced acreage subject to the claims
of the general populace. This picture is not completely fanciful.
Although the "public lands" are technically federally-owned lands
and interests therein managed by the United States Department of
Interior Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), they serve many
public uses, fulfilling demands for recreation, minerals, forage,
timber, and other resources and activities.' Decisions of the BLM
made while administering the lands operate as allocations of resources, and impact divergent values. Individuals concerned with
particular attributes of the affected area naturally desire to influence these choices. 2 This article will examine certain procedural
rules of the BLM, as interpreted by the Interior Board of Land
Appeals ("IBLA," or "the Board"),3 to ascertain how and why the
public participates in public land management.
* Private practitioner, Denver, Co.; J.D. 1978, University of Wyoming; B.A. 1974,
Yale University.
1. Because this article concerns BLM adjudications, it employs the statutory definition of "Public Lands." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982). The previously accepted definition of

public lands included those lands of the United States subject to disposition under the
general land laws. Kindred v. Union Pac. R.R., 225 U.S. 582 (1912); Columbia Basin Land
Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). The definition, found in the

congressional description of the Public Land Law Review Commission's ("PLLRC") mandate, included not only BLM-managed lands, but National Park Service, Forest Service,

and Fish and Wildlife Service lands, thus approximating the common understanding of the
term. 78 Stat. 982 (1964) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418, expired in 1970 pursuant to
43 U.S.C. § 1418). For a background on the PLLRC, see Phipps, The Public Land Law
Review Commision - A Challenge to the West, I LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1966);
Hagenstein, Commissions and PublicLand Policies: Setting the Stage for Change, 54 DEN.
L.J. 619 (1977).
2. See Landstrom, Citizen Participation in Public Land Decisions, 9 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 372 (1965); P. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE

ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND BLM 1-21 (1981).
3. The IBLA is the Board within the BLM designated to hear appeals dealing with
public lands, minerals, and certain aspects of acquired land administration. 35 Fed. Reg.
12,081 (1970); see also infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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There are four components to this examination. The first describes the position the IBLA developed regarding public access
to agency decisions when it is not compelled by Congress to adopt
specific procedures. The second component analyzes where in
conventional administrative law theory this response could be categorized. The third component attempts to see why the position
was adopted. Finally, the feasibility of improving the process is
explored. The analysis reveals that the agency developed procedures in response to the substantive statutes administered and that
its solution might not be optimal.
In order to assess agency action, the IBLA's treatment of
informal adjudication by the BLM is examined. The procedures
considered govern what is known as the "informal adjudicative
decision." Such decisions are informal because neither a statute
4
nor the Constitution mandates the use of any specific procedure.
This species of agency activity is not governed by specific congressional directive nor by the mandates of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 5 Therefore, the informal decision represents
agencies' own conceptions of fairness and administrative necessity. However, such decisions are adjudicative in that they determine the application of statutes and standards to a particular fac6
tual situation.
This article attempts to address the recent lack of focus on
the administrative procedures of the BLM and the Department of
Interior ("DOI" or "the Department"). However, because these
4. This definition accords with the typology of Professor Verkuil, who states that
such action is "a residual category of procedural entitlement that grows or diminishes in
'formality' more by judicial and administrative notions of fairness than by legislative plan
or design." Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudicative Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. Rev.
739, 739 n.1 (1976); see also Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE
L.J. 1487, 1488 (1983).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).

6. The PLLRC, in describing BLM procedures, contrasted "adjudication" with

"rulemaking":

[R]ulemaking [is] the development and promulgation of substantive and procedural regulations designed to announce the standards under which a statute
will be administered; and ...adjudication [is] the application of statutes and
regulations to particular fact situations on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether applicants are entitiled to the various rights or privileges provided for
by law.
PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 251 (1970) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
ONE THIRD].

1988]

Public Land Appeals

procedures were subjected to extensive commentary, criticism,
and reform during the previous two decades, Section II provides
a historical overview that identifies the mission of the Department
and prior attempts at adjudicatory fairness.
With the historical context thus outlined, Section III analyzes
the role of the IBLA in administering the public lands through the
appellate process, focusing on access to the Board and the effect
of its jurisdiction. Since its creation in 1970, the IBLA has interpreted both the BLM's regulations and its own in a broad fashion
that emphasizes and facilitates public participation. The IBLA has
translated vague regulatory provisions into a structured system
assuring public access to both the BLM and to the Board as a
reviewing body. Despite broad authority to substitute its judgment
for that of the BLM, the IBLA rarely employed this power. More
often, it merely forced the BLM to consider additional arguments.
This mode of administrative action closely approximates the "interest representation" model in which agencies provide forums to
fine tune legislative actions rather than merely implementing predetermined statutory goals or being themselves uniquely qualified
to protect the public interest. 7 The term "interest representation"
is derived from Professor Stewart's 1975 article, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, in which he recognized that the
role of many agencies had been changed to resemble mini-legislatures. 8 Therefore the term "reformed administrative law" is
meaningful in the sense that the IBLA has internalized the interest
representation model.
The impetus for the IBLA's actions, which were taken on its
own and in the context of informal adjudication, is examined in
Section IV. The analysis concludes that the nature of the statutes
administered determines the procedural choices. Procedure follows substance, or in this case, the lack of substance. Although
its decisions impact many divergent values, the BLM was given
the authority to allocate the resources of the public lands without
firm congressional guidance.
The BLM has received amorphous, conflicting, or even nonexistent policy direction from Congress. The BLM's decisions
7. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1670 (1975).
8. Id. at 1760-62; see also Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept ofRights,
92 YALE L.J. 1174 (1983).
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often irretrievably affect intertwined resource uses. In view of the
nature of the statutes, the BLM must make these polycentric
decisions without concrete standards. 9 Faced with such a dilemma,
the IBLA has internalized the "interest representation model" of
administrative law, possibly in an attempt to approach decisionmaking in a mode of "comprehensive rationality.' 0 There are two
distinct decisionmaking paradigms. "Interest representation,"
which views administrative action as a substitute for legislative
policy-setting, simply requires that all affected concerns be addressed. "Comprehensive rationality," however, implies that an
agency should reasonably sift through all possible responses to a
problem in order to achieve an optimal method of reaching a
specified goal. Procedures that foster the development of alternative views are crucial to both decisionmaking paradigms.
Open access to the decisionmaking process provides many
benefits, including an increase in information and range of viewpoints represented. However, as employed by the IBLA, open
access can frustrate orderly administration of the public lands.
Section V reveals the difficulties inherent in the choice of interest
representation as a mode of action. It encumbers the administrative process with increased costs and delays. Furthermore, the
policy might actually decrease careful deliberation. Therefore, in
Section VI this article concludes that a middle ground could be
achievable if the IBLA treated intervention in the administrative
proceeding, rather than standing to appeal the BLM decision, as
the relevant issue..
Intervention, most simply expressed, is the procedure
whereby a person not initially a party to a case enters the process
in order to assert and protect an interest in the subject matter."
The APA does not address intervention by that name but embraces
the concept when it states that "an interested person may appear
before an agency... in an agency proceeding ...

or in connection

with an agency function.' 1 2 The differences between the concepts
9. Terminology drawn from Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353 (1978); Eisenberg, Participation,Responsiveness and the ConsultativeProcess:
An Essayfor Lon Fuller,92 HARV. L. REV. 410 (1978); see also infra notes 169-74.

10. Terminology drawn from Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin Administrative Law,
95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1669. For more detailed definitions
of these terms, see infra note 119.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 736 (5th ed. 1979).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
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of "standing to appeal" and "ability to intervene" provide the
mechanism for flexible responses that would ameliorate the problems of efficient resource allocation.
Procedures could change without sacrificing the benefits of
input because the IBLA actually provides a second level of agency
participation by allowing appeals to it from BLM decisions. In
certain instances these appeals provide automatic stays of activity

and can take over three years to resolve. However, the BLM also
provides a forum through which members of the public can present
evidence and arguments in favor of their positions. The process
could be improved by retaining unlimited entry to the BLM, but
limiting access to the second level by using the balancing test
applied to intervention rather than mechanically applying tests
designed to ascertain standing to appeal a decision.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Because the BLM is subordinate to the Secretary of Interior,
and is therefore part of the Executive Branch, the proper embarkment point in tracing its administrative functions is the Constitution. In expansive terms, the Constitution empowers Congress to
"dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
.... 13 Beginning in 1849, general statutes designated the Secretary of the Interior as the executive officer in charge of such
14
matters when public lands were involved.
The courts found these statutes to be proper delegations of
authority, conferring upon the Secretary and his subordinates the
right to hear and determine claims to the public lands.1 5 However,
13. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl.2. This clause was construed as granting virtually
plenary power to Congress in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). For the debate
over the merit of this grant of power, see McFarland, The Unique Role of Discretion in
Public Land Lav, 16 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 35 (1971); Wilkinson, The Fieldof Public
Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I Pun. LAND L. REv. 1, 715 (1980); Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the
PublicLands: The FederalLand Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative
Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51-65 (1984).
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1201, 1451, 1457 (1982).
15. Cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523 (1911), construed in Engdahl, State and FederalPower over Federal Property,
18 Aiuz L. REv. 283, 309 (1976) (examples of the Supreme Court's approval of delegation
of proprietary powers under property clause without reference to standards which at the
time impeded the delegation of legislative power).
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if a subordinate acted, the Secretary reserved the power to review
and, if necessary, to reverse all proceedings that alienated or allowed the use of any portion of these lands. 6 Construing the
Mining Law of 1872,17 the Supreme Court affirmed not only the
general responsibility of the Secretary to see that "valid claims
.. be recognized, invalid claims be eliminated, and the rights of
the public preserved,' '1 8 but also acknowledged that procedural
fairness must be maintained:
Of course, the Land Department has no power to strike down
any claim arbitrarily, but so long as the land title remains in
the Government, it does have the power, after proper notice
and upon adequate hearing, to determine whether the claim is
valid, and, if found invalid, to declare it null and void ....9

The Department, in recognition of these duties, began to develop
rules for hearings and other appeals as early as the 1800's. Ob20
viously, these rules evolved over time.
By the 1950's, and until a major revision in 1970, the basic
provisions for review of a BLM field decision detailed a two-level
process. 21 First, an appeal to the Director of the BLM could be
16. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-82 (1891).
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982).
18. Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920).
19. Id.; see also Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).
20. See generally Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, The Effect of the FederalLandPolicy
and Management Act on Adjudication Procedures in the Department of the Interior and
JudicialReview of AdjudicationDecisions, 21 Amz. L. REV. 541 (1979). For details of the

rules covering factual hearings, see Geissinger, Rules of ProcedureGoverning Department
of the Interior Contests, 7 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 477 (1962); Traylor, Proceedings
Before the Bureau of Land Management in Contests Initiated by the U.S. Government, 4
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 593 (1958).
21. The earliest regulations critiqued and discussed below were promulgated in 1954.
19 Fed. Reg. 9056 (1954) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 221). As a result of revisions published
in 1956, the regulations moved closer to their modem form. 21 Fed. Reg. 1859 (1956)
(codified at 43 C.F.R. § 221). Most of the critics analyzed the regulations appearing in 43
C.F.R. §§ 1840, 1850 from 1964 until June of 1970. 29 Fed. Reg. 4326 (1964) (codified as
amended at 43 C.F.R. §§ 1842-1844, especially § 1842.4). For descriptions, see Comment,
Conservationand the Public Lands: Administrative and JudicialRemedies Relating to the
Use and Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by the Department of Interior, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1206-08 (1970); McCarty, A View of the Decision-Making Process
Within the Department of Interior, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 157-68 (1966); Wheatley, A
Study of Administrative Procedures-TheDepartment of Interior, 43 GEo. L.J. 166 (1955);
C. MCFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 171-76 (PLLRC

Study Report, 1969). Major revisions were again made in 1970. See infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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lodged through the deciding official. 22 This appeal would involve
only briefs and written submittals unless the Director determined
that the case contained a substantial question of disputed fact and
ordered a hearing. 23 If the private party was disappointed with the
Director's ultimate decision, he or she could appeal to the Secretary of Interior.2 4 In practice, however, the Solicitor of the DOI or
25
his delegate normally wrote and decided these latter appeals.
As many commentators have observed, the system bred numerous flaws. 26 First, and perhaps foremost, the process diverged
from the spirit of the APA. While the APA does not apply directly
to most BLM decisions, it is recognized as a conceptual paradigm
for administrative decisionmaking. 27 Precedents embodied in internal manuals and prior adjudications were not uniformly promulgated and often were contradictory. 28 Sometimes, the appellant
22. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4 (1969) (establishing a 30-day limit in which a party

can file an appeal); id. § 1842.5-1 (requiring a Statement of Reasons for appeal).
23. Id. § 1843.5. Because this article examines only informal adjudication, the decisions discussed herein are those considered in the absence of statutory or constitutional
mandates for hearings or other special procedures. Prior to the establishment of the IBLA
in 1969, hearings as of right were limited. Id. §§ 1851-1853, 3513, 3530; see also Strauss,
Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of Interior Department Procedures, 1974 UTAH
L. REV. 185, 213-15; Sturges, Administrative and Judicial Review of Interior Department
Decision, RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., July 1985, at 1, 24; Landstrom, supra note 2, at
387; Comment, supra note 21, at 1204-06; Edelstein, Administrative Procedure and the
Mining and MineralLaws, 11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 421,432 (1966); C. McFARLAND,
supra note 21, at 168; Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
24. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1844.1, 1844.9 (1969) (Secretary's decision is final).
25. 24 Fed. Reg. 1348 (1959) (review authority delegated to Solicitor as well as Under
and Assistant Secretaries); 27 Fed. Reg. 6851 (1962) (further delegation of authority to
Assistant Solicitor); McCarty, supra note 21, at 163-64; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455
(1982) (duties of officials given such authority).
26. In addition to the defects discussed below, which were directly caused by the
administrative review process, many thought that sporadic and deferential judicial review
exacerbated the problems of administrative review. See, e.g., Peck, Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions of Bureau of Land Management and Secretary of the Interior, 9
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 225, 235-42 (1964); Parriott, The Administrative Procedures
Act and the Department of Interior, 4 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 436, 455-60 (1958);
Comment, supra note 21, at 1220-53; C. McFARLAND, supra note 21, at 183-86; Clyde,
Administrative Aspects of the PLLRC Report, 6 LAND & WATER L. REv. 265 (1970);
McFarland, supra note 13, at 48-52.
27. See generally Parriott, supra note 26; Wheatley, supra note 21; see also ONE
THIRD, supra note 6, at 253:
We find procedural problems in existing adjudicative procedures in two broad
areas: (A) informal and formal procedures for developing the factual record
for decision; and (B) the appellate decisionmaking structure as it bears on
(1) separation of the adjudicatory function from other investigatory, advisory
or program responsibilities, and (2) delays in rendering "final" decisions.
28. Parriott notes the general unavailability of digests and previous decisions, al-
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did not know what constituted the "record" before the decisionmaker, partially because ex parte communications were rampant. 29
Additionally, because each level of review had original jurisdiction
and plenary authority, the rationale for the -ultimate decision might
not have been argued. 30 Moreover, although the BLM officials who
decided appeals and the Solicitor were nominally insulated in their
adjudicatory functions, they were not divorced from the daily
concerns of the agency, and either advised or directed lower
3
officers. '
Fundamental elements of due process-namely the opportunity to know and meet the opposition's case 32-often received
short shrift in these informal adjudications.3 3 Furthermore, the
procedure applied to most public land-use decisions, because few
of the statutes administered by the BLM were interpreted to require the hearing apparatus of the APA (partially due to the early
vintage of the statutes). 34 Adthough the number of decisions conthough he points out some recent improvements. Parriott, supra note 26, at 436-38; see
also Wheatley, supra note 21, at 173-74; Landstrom, supra note 2, at 375; C. McFARLAND,
supra note 21, at 263--64.
29. For example, Parriott noted that confidential "jackets" placed on BLM files to
prevent outside perusal, limited access to decisionmakers alone. Parriott, supra note 26,
at 438; see also Comment, supra note 21, at 1207-08; McCarty, supra note 21, at 177-78.
30. Carver, Administrative Law and Public Land Management, 18 ADMIN. L. REv.
7, 15-16 (1965); Bloomenthal, AdministrativeProcedures,6 LAND & WATER L. REv.241,
254 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the
FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 803-04 (1981); McCarty, supra
note 21, at 172-74; Comment, supra note 21, at 1201-03. However, Frishberg, Hickey, and
Kleiler argue that this problem is not as egregious as it has been portrayed by other
commentators. Frishberg, Hickey & Kleller, supra note 20, at 545-47, 550-51. In fact, the
APA itself only requires separation of functions in hearings "on the record." 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d) (1982). For a discussion of the desirability of such separation, see The SplitEnforcement Model For Agency Adjudication-Recommendation No. 86-4, 1 CF.R.
§ 305.86-4 (1987). Friendly argues that total separation of these two functions is neither
possible nor desirable. Friendly, A Look at FederalAdministrative Agencies, 60 COLUM.
L. REv. 429, 441-46 (1960).
32. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 16, reh'g denied, 304 U.S. 590 (1938)
(the right to respond is a fundamental element of due process).
33. Bloomenthal, supra note 30, at 254, 260; Carver, supra note 30, at 17; McCarty,
supra note 21, at 178.
34. In 1965, hearings occurred in only a fraction of one percent of the cases considered. Carver, The Federal ProprietaryFunction-A Neglected Aspect of FederalAdministrativeLaw, 19 ADMIN. L. REv. 107, 111 (1967). Frishberg, Hickey and Kleler examine
the Department of the Interior's use of the rights/privilege dichotomy in its due process
analysis, which resulted in granting hearings when the validity of a mineral lease was at
issue. Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note 20, at 569-71. Edelstein criticizes this
distinction. Edelstein, supra note 23, at 428-31; see also Wheatley, supra note 21, at 20405. However, Strauss argues that the Department granted too much due process to mining
claimants, thereby hampering land management. Strauss, supra note 23, at 213-19.
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fronting the BLM each year would overwhelm any attempt to
provide initial evidentiary hearings in all instances, this cursory
analysis demonstrates that reform was necessary.
Critics seeking procedural reforms embraced two disparate
ideals. Some, including the Public Land Law Review Commission
("PLLRC"), admitted that adjudicative practices could be im-

proved, but emphasized a need to substitute rulemaking with public participation for the then prevalent reliance on adjudicatory
decisions to interpret statutes.3 5 Although the BLM had published
numerous regulations, very few went beyond repeating statutory
language and thus provided little interpretive insight.3 6 One illustration of the problem often employed by critics was the difficulty
a prospector would have defining what constituted a "discovery"

of a "valuable mineral," a predicate to a valid mining claim. Purportedly, such a definition could require resort to voluminous de-

cisional material. 37 In addition to clarity, the participatory nature
of rulemaking could eliminate the problems of ex parte communications and allow all interested persons to have standing to
38
contribute.
Other voices cautioned that because it is impossible to anticipate all possible scenarios, too great a reliance on rulemaking
could ossify decisionmaking and hinder necessary policy
35. The PLLRC advised as follows:
Recommendation 108: Congress should require public land management agencies to utilize rulemaking to the fullest extent possible in interpreting statutes
and in exercising delegated discretion, and should provide legislative restrictions to insure compliance with this goal.
ecommendation 109: Congress should direct the public land agencies to restructure their adjudication organization and procedures in order to assure:
(1) procedural due process; (2) greater third party participation; (3) objective
administrative review of initial decisions; and (4) more expeditious decisionmaking.
ONE THIRD, supra note 6, at 251, 253; see also C. McFARLAND, supra note 21, at 6-9,
295-329; cf. Carver & Landstrom, Rule-making as a Means of Exercising Secretarial
Discretion in Public Land Actions, 8 ARIz. L. REv. 46, 58-62 (1966); McFarland, supra
note 13, at 40-41 (arguing for greater statutory guidance and, within the BLM, more use
of "interpretive" regulations); see also McCarty, supra note 21, at 180-81.
36. For example, Carver argued that a lack of standards creates due process problems. Carver, supra note 34, at 116; see also McFarland, supra note 13, at 40-41; C.
MCFARLAND, supra note 21, at 237-40.
37. See Carver, supra note 30, at 15; see also C. McFARLAND, supra note 21, at 54,
308-09.
38. Carver & Landstrom, supra note 35, at 59.
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changes.3 9 Rulemongers were reminded that a "rule of law," desired for predictability and fairness, did not necessarily require
specific regulations-improved appellate procedures could achieve
the same ends. To do so, the process must force the BLM to
review all relevant precedents raised by adversaries with competing interests. 40 Flexibility to respond to changing conditions would
remain.
In one respect, almost all critics concurred: more public participation was necessary. In regard to rulemaking, all believed the
Department of Interior should modify its position that the APA's
notice and comment provisions did not apply to BLM regulations
under the Act's "public property" exception. 4' In the adjudicatory
arena, although the existent procedures did make provision for
third parties to enter into the process, in the words of high departmental officials, "the privilege [was] not widely known or
understood."42 The PLLRC called for third party notification of
43
pending actions and liberal intervention rights.
39. Bloomenthal argues that the attempts to define "valuable mineral" by regulation
were misguided. Bloomenthal, supra note 30, at 244-46. Strauss posits that the evolution
of this term reflected necessary policy changes. Strauss, supra note 23, at 256-58. Earlier
in his article, Strauss cautioned:
[The miners'] most frequent complaint, that the Department "makes policy"
rather than "applies the law," is somewhat misplaced. What the miners disapprove is that the Department no longer acts as if it were 1872 in applying
this 1872 statute. But it is no longer 1872, and the Department cannot tenably
be required to ignore the striking changes in its general mandate, even if this
particular statute has been more durable than most.
Id. at 187 (emphasis in original). This evolutionary phenomenon is typical of the incremental
mode of policymaking by adjudication. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 10, at 404-06 (asserting
that the foci of adjudicative decisionmaking are sequential and remedial and therefore the
model is dynamic, not static).
40. See Bloomenthal, supra note 30, at 251.
41. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 21, at 296; ONE THIRD, supra note 6, at 253-54; C.
REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS 13 (1962); McCarty, supra note 21, at 170-71;
Comment, supra note 21, at 1213-14. However, Landstrom argues that actual public
participation was greater than acknowledged, partially because in 1958 the BLM voluntarily
submitted its rulemaking to notice and comment. Landstrom, supra note 2, at 378-83; see
also Loesch, Multiple Use of Public Lands-Accommodation or Choosing Between Conflicting Uses, 16 RocKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 1, 19-20 (1971).
42. Carver & Landstrom, supra note 35, at 59 n.60 (discussing 43 C.F.R. §§ 18421844, 1852.1-2 (1965)).
43. ONE THIRD, supra note 6, at 253-54. The PLLRC also desired to limit standing
for judicial review strictly to those who had participated in administrative appeals. Noting
the impossibility of ever providing adequate notice to all interested parties, one commentator found this aspect of the report backward-looking. Bloomenthal, supra note 30, at 262.
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Thus, the PLLRC expressed the need not only for greater
mandatory rulemaking, but also for detailed procedures to improve

adjudication of appeals, which included, as a central component,
provisions for public input. 44 After receipt of the PLLRC report,
Congress attempted to provide a coherent statutory framework for
the BLM. It repealed many scattered laws and granted new, more
centralized authority through the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, commonly referred to as the FLPMA or the
BLM Organic Act. 45 It implemented some-but not all-of the

recommendations of the PLLRC. 46 Although the FLPMA frequently mandates public participation in specific activities for general administrative procedures, 47 Congress primarily referred to
the recommendations in hortatory policy statements. These statements indicate preferences for judicial review, public participation
in rulemaking, and improved adjudicatory practices.48
Possibly, Congress felt that it need not act on appellate procedures because the Department of Interior substantially modified
its practices in 1970. The Office of Hearings and Appeals ("OHA")
emerged to place review of initial agency decisions directly under
the Secretary, rather than under the control of the head of the
BLM or the Solicitor, whose subordinates also advised, investi44. See supra note 35.
45. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Prior to passage of this Act and
its repeal of numerous dispersed statutes, it was "absolute dogma" when discussing the
BLM to mention that it administered more than 5,000 statutes. Parriott, supra note 26, at
436. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the FLPMA was its adoption of the position
that the public lands generally should be retained in federal ownership. Prior statutes
envisioned more disposals. See generally P. GATES, HISTORY OF PuInLIc LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT (1968); M. CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED (1983).

46. See generally Carver, FederalLand Policy and Management Act of 1976: Fruition or Frustration,54 DEN. L.J. 387 (1977); Sturges, supra note 23; Muys, The Public
Land Law Review Commission's Impact on the FederalLand Policy and Management Act
of 1976, 21 Aiuz. L. REV. 301 (1979).
47. On mandated notice and comment throughout the FLPMA, see Bradley & Ingram, Science vs. the Grass Roots: Representation in the Bureau of Land Management,
26 NAT. RESouRcE J. 493, 499 (1986); Note, Interest Representation and the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1303 (1982); Achterman & Fairfax,
The Public ParticipationRequirements of FLPMA, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 501 (1979).
48. The policy section of the FLPMA, which is not self-implementing, reflects general
congressional desires for "adequate third-party participation, objective administrative review, and expedition in decisionmaking ....
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5)-(6) (1982). For specific instructions in limited situations, see id. § 1740 (to implement the FLPMA, the Secretary should promulgate regulations under the APA without reference to the "public
property" exception); id. §§ 1732(c), 1776 (establishing hearing requirements for easement
or land authorization revocations); see also generally Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra
note 20, at 541-44.
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gated, and prosecuted matters for the agency. The IBLA was

established as the Board within this office designated to hear appeals dealing with the public lands, minerals, and certain aspects
of acquired land administration. 49 This structural change naturally
led to a revision of the regulations controlling appeals.50 These
regulations, as subsequently modified and interpreted by the
IBLA, will be reviewed extensively in the following section. The
discussion will emphasize the availability and possible effects of
public input. For simplicity's sake, the "public" may be defined
as those persons not directly related to the activity being considered; that is, anyone other than the seeker of authorization to use
51
the public lands.
III. INFORMAL ADJUDICATION IN ACTION

Although the FLPMA did not provide direct guidance on how
to implement third party participation in informal adjudicatory
proceedings, the IBLA has transformed open-ended regulations
into a regimented system for such input.5 2 These regulations apply
to decisionmaking in general, and do not implement specific sta49. See 35 Fed. Reg. 12,081 (1970) (creating the IBLA and outlining its organizational
structure and delegations of authority). Department of Interior officials had previously
urged such changes. See, e.g., McCarty, Proposalsfor Changesin Appeals Proceduresat
the Department of Interior, 13 ADMIN. L. REv. 159 (1960). However, the revision was at
least partially a response to outside stimuli. Although unsuccessful, a bill had been introduced in Congress to reform the Department's procedures by creating a board of appeals.
S.758, 88th Cong. 1st Sess (1964), discussed in Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note
20, at 547-49; see also Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton, 370 F. Supp. 108, 127-29 (D. Colo. 1973)
(holding that the unrevised procedures violated due process).
50. 35 Fed. Reg. 9522 (1970) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-3 to .0-9); 35 Fed. Reg.
10,010 (1970) (modified 43 C.F.R. §§ 1840, 1850). In 1971, the regulations were again revised
and moved to their current location, namely 43 C.F.R. § 4 (1987). See 36 Fed. Reg. 7185207, 7588 (1971); 36 Fed. Reg. 15,116-19 (1972). With certain minor revisions, these regulations control today. For a discussion of these structural revisions, see generally Day,
Administrative Proceduresin the DepartmentofInterior: The Role of the Office ofHearings
and Appeals, 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1972).

51. Compare this to the definition of"public" in planning regulations, which includes
affected or interested individuals or groups. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(h) (1987).
52. When the FLPMA requires it, the BLM provides other mechanisms for public
participation. For example, resource management plans must be formulated with public
input. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982). Regulations provide for informational and other hearings.
Id. § 1610 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Participation requirements, however, do not extend to
decisions implementing these plans. See National Public Lands Task Force, 70 I.B.L.A.
214 (Jan. 24, 1983); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3420.1-5, .3-4 (1987) (as amended by 52 Fed. Reg.
46,469 (Dec. 8, 1987)) (discussing the public hearings in regard to coal leasing, required by
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (1982)).
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tutory directives. 53 To understand fully what the IBLA has

wrought, its position within the DOI must be clarified.

A. The Nature of the IBLA's Authority

As part of the OHA, the IBLA is the representative of the
Secretary of Interior with authority to determine matters in its
jurisdiction fully and finally. Except for employee and contractual
disputes, most BLM appeals are within the IBLA's realm. 54 In
addition to the IBLA and three other appeal panels, the OHA
contains a Hearings Division, which is comprised of administrative
law judges authorized to conduct "on the record" hearings pursuant to the APA. 5 5 Attorneys employed by the DOI's Office of
the Solicitor represent the government before both the IBLA and
the Hearings Division. 56 Although the three-judge panels that decide most appeals taken to the IBLA might resemble a familiar
part of the traditional adversary system, four crucial elements of
the Board's authority demonstrate how it functions as a surrogate
for the Secretary of the Interior.
First, the IBLA has the full power of the Secretary to review
decisions of subordinates. The Board will not be bound by prior
57
determinations of fact or applications of law by BLM employees.
The IBLA will not even deem as authoritative instruction memoranda that are signed by the Director of the BLM and intended to
53. For instance, planning decisions are not appealed to the IBLA. Instead, any
person who participated in the planning process may protest to the Director of the BLM,
whose decision is final. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2 (1987). Compare this with the general "protest"
regulation. See infra note 77 and accompanying text; see also generally Sturges, supra
note 23 (a general overview of procedures, including instances where an intermediate review
by a BLM offcial is available before resort to the IBLA).
54. 43 C.F.R. § 4.l(b)(3) (1987). In addition to appeals concerning public lands, their
resources, and minerals in acquired lands, the IBLA also considers appeals dealing with
off-shore oil and gas leases, native land selections in Alaska, and environmental aspects of
coal mining. Id. The IBLA's jurisdiction, however, does not extend to awards of damages
for breach of contract on common law theories, even if the contract involved is a federal
oil and gas lease. See Exxon Corp., 95 I.B.L.A. 374 (Feb. 18, 1987).
55. 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4) (1987). The other boards are the Board of
Indian Appeals, the Board of Contract Appeals, and the Ad Hoc Board of Appeals.
56. 43 C.F.R. § 4.3(b) (1987).
57. Peabody Coal Co., 93 Interior Dec. 394, 398, 93 I.B.L.A. 317 (1986); Pathfinder
Mines Corp., 90 Interior Dec. 10, 18, 70 I.B.L.A. 264 (1983), aff'd, Pathfinder Mines Corp.
v. Clark, 620 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ariz. 1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987).
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guide administration of the law. 8 Moreover, it may sua sponte
require the development of additional facts or legal arguments it
believes necessary.5 9 When a dispositive issue exists, it may also
rule on such grounds even if not argued by the parties."
Second, the IBLA serves as the final arbiter of appeals taken
from the BLM (absent unusual circumstances), much in the same
way that the Secretary has the final word in the Department of the
Interior. 61 The IBLA binds the BLM, and the latter is bound by
the former's rulings. 62 The BLM never can appeal an IBLA decision to the courts, although it may request that the Board itself
reconsider. 63 The BLM does, however, have recourse to political
channels, either through direct secretarial action or by amendment
of regulations that the BLM feels have been wrongly interpreted
by the IBLA.64
The political maneuvers available to the BLM underscore the
third aspect of the IBLA's power: because the IBLA is a surrogate,
or a wielder of delegated power, it cannot contradict the source of
its authority. If the Secretary of Interior or any of the Assistant
or Undersecretaries have signed or approved a decision, the IBLA
will not have review jurisdiction.6 5 The IBLA also may not secondguess policy choices or legal conclusions in a decision of the BLM
that responds to a secretarial directive; it can only review the
BLM decision to, ascertain whether that decision conforms with
the directive.6 6 Similiarly, duly promulgated regulations bind the
IBLA and therefore it may not declare them invalid. 67
58. Thunderbird Oil Corp., 91 I.B.L.A. 195 (Mar. 31, 1986); United States v. Kaycee
Bentonite Corp., 89 Interior Dec. 262, 64 I.B.L.A. 183 (1982). Instruction memoranda are
thus analogous to interpretive rules before courts.
59. Larson v. Utah, 50 I.B.L.A. 382 (Oct. 22, 1980).
60. Shiny Rock Mining Co., 77 I.B.L.A. 261 (Nov. 30, 1983) (on reconsideration);
United States v. Elbert Gassaway, 43 I.B.L.A. 382 (Oct. 31, 1979) (IBLA not limited to
theories raised by parties); El Paso Products Co., 10 I.B.L.A. 116 (Mar. 9, 1973) (IBLA
obliged to consider entire record).
61. Ark Land Co., 97 I.B.L.A. 241, 248 (May 13, 1987).
62. H.R. Delasco, Inc., 39 I.B.L.A. 194 (Feb. 2, 1979); Champlin Petroleum Co., 89
Interior Dec. 561, 68 I.B.L.A. 142 (1982).
63. Any party may seek reconsideration, which will not stay the effectiveness of the
decision (unless so ordered by the Director or by IBLA) or its finality for judicial review.
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.21(c), 4.403 (1987). The BLM also may appeal to the IBLA from the decision
of an administrative law judge in certain situations. Id. §§ 4.452-9, 4.476.
64. See infra notes 66, 67.
65. 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(3) (1987).
66. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 50 I.B.L.A. 59 (Feb. 20, 1980); A.C.O.T.S., 60 I.B.L.A.
1 (Nov. 12, 1981).
67. Chugach Alaska Corp., 94 I.B.L.A. 24 (Sept. 25, 1986); Garland Coal & Mining
Co., 88 Interior Dec. 24, 52 I.B.L.A. 60 (1980) (IBLA can invalidate a rule if that rule has
not been duly promulgated, is contrary to statute, and has been consistently ignored).
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The final important corollary of the delegated nature of the
IBLA's authority is the simple truism, "he who gives may also
take." The Secretary may review the decision of or assume juridiction over any matter before any subordinate, including the
IBLA, at any time. 68 Express notification of all parties, however,
must precede the taking of jurisdiction over an appeal pending
before the IBLA. 69 Therefore, the Secretary of Interior has the
regulatory authority to maintain ultimate supervision of the Department, although this power is invoked infrequently. The Department has considered, and rejected, providing for appeals to
the Secretary in all instances. 70
This structure enables the IBLA to make significant policy
determinations without secretarial oversight when it adjudicates
appeals. The impact of a decision may not be communicated to
the Secretary nor even fully appreciated at the time. Therefore,
appellate practice comprises an important opportunity to influence
71
the direction of public land management.
B. Access to the IBLA
72
Relatively few regulations govern review of informal actions.
The threshold requirement for access to the IBLA states that "any
68. 43 C.F.R. § 4.5 (1987).
69. The notice requirement was added after a particularly frustrating example of
confusion engendered when the IBLA misconstrued an action as secretarial approval of a
decision under review. In one instance, the IBLA cited a letter to the Governor of Wyoming
from the Acting Undersecretary as depriving the Board of jurisdiction and dismissed the
appeal. After the letter was determined to not have been so intended, the IBLA overturned
the BLM action upon remand from District Court. However, this latter action occurred
after the original decision had been defended in court for eighteen months. When the IBLA
decision was subsequently appealed, the U.S. Attorney found himself at counsel table with
his prior opponents. See Sierra Club, 80 I.B.L.A. 251 (May 2, 1984) (on judicial remand);
Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985), aff'd sub. nom., Texaco
Producing, Inc. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1988).
70. Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note 20, at 554-55. When the regulation
detailing the Secretary's power to assume jurisdiction was amended, the Department stated
that it did not intend to change the practice of rare use. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,689 (1978) (codified
at 43 C.F.R. § 4.5).
71. For objections to this state of affairs, see Bloomenthal, supra note 30, at 25657; Strauss, supra note 23, at 253-64; Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of
Law in an Executive Department:Reflections on the InteriorDepartment'sAdministration
of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1231, 1254-60 (1974); Procedures of the Department
of Interior with Respect to Mining Claims on the Public Lands-Recommendation No. 743, 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-3 (1987). The PLLRC also rejected a total separation of review
functions from secretarial policy control. ONE THIRD, supra note 6, at 254; cf. Freedman,
Review Boards in Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 546, 558-59 (1969) (in a
judicial model of review, boards would only implement existing policy).
72. For information regarding the mechanics of appeal, see 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.411-4.415
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party to a case adversely affected by a decision of an officer of
the Bureau of Land Management or an administrative law judge
shall have the right to appeal" to the IBLA. 73 The regulation lists

only limited exceptions to this privilege.7 4 If a decision is not within
one of these express exceptions, the BLM cannot circumvent an
appeal. Therefore, in questionable situations, the IBLA itself has
the jurisdiction to consider the scope of its own jurisdiction regarding the parties seeking review before it-the BLM cannot, on
its own authority, foreclose access to the IBLA. 75 As long as the
person or organization attempting to appeal is both "a party to the
case" and "adversely affected," almost all day-to-day decisions of
the BLM can reach the IBLA. This dual-sided criterion needs
further explication.
The first requirement for a potential appellant, that of being
"a party to the case," can often be determined without difficulty.
The applicant whose request to use public lands or to develop
their resources is rejected or granted on objectionable terms is
obviously a party to the case and the BLM will inform this party,
by decision, of its disposition of the request. Similiarly, a person
served with an order to perform or a notice of a violation of a
(1987). The appeal is decided upon the file and briefs unless a particular statute or regulation
entitles an adversely affected party to a hearing or unless the Board in its discretion orders
a hearing to resolve a material issue of fact. Id. § 4.415; see also Norman G. Lavery, 96
I.B.L.A. 294 (Mar. 3, 1987). Actions currently requiring hearings include: (1)the invalidation of mining claims or other entries for matters of fact not revealed in BLM records,
43 C.F.R. §§ 450-452 (1987); (2) the termination or suspension of certain land-use authorizations, id. § 2920.9-3, or right-of-way grants, id. §§ 2803.4, 2883.6; (3) the cancellation of
geothermal leases, id. § 3244.3; (4) the rejection of preference right leases, id. §§ 3430.5-2,
3513.4, 3523.4, 3533.4, 3543.4, 3553.4, 3563.4; (5) the imposition of penalties under the
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act or for coal trespass, id.
§§ 3163.4-1, 9239.53(f)(3); (6) the resolution of any appeal involving grazing, id.§ 4160; and (7) the resolution
of issues raised by the filing of verified petitions by mining claimants under certain laws,
id.§§ 3700, 3740. See also generallySturges, supra note 23.
73. 43 C.F.R. § 410(a) (1987).
74. Id. The only decisions excepted are those made under certain listed regulations
that are required to be taken to an administrative law judge or approved by the Secretary.
A regulation not listed, but which states that the Director of the BLM has final review
authority of decisions adopting resource plans, also forecloses IBLA jurisdiction. Wilderness Soc'y, 90 I.B.L.A. 221 (Jan. 30, 1986) (construing 43 C.F.R. § 1610,5-2(b)); cf.
Minchumina Homeowners' Ass'n, 93 I.B.L.A. 169 (Aug. 15, 1986) (construing 43 C.F.R.
§ 4.410(b)) (recounting the more limited appeal rights available under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act); United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 97 I.B.L.A. 367 (May 27,
1987); see also Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1052 (1979) (Bazelon, J.,concurring) (predecessor of regulation); 43 C.F.R.
§ 4160.4 (1986); id. § 23.12 (1987) (rights to appeal are accorded to any "person whose
interest is adversely affected" by a grazing decision or by certain mining decisions).
75. James C. Mackey, 96 I.B.L.A. 356 (Apr. 10, 1987).
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relevant regulation, lease, permit, or contract term must be a
"party" to that enforcement action.
Other individuals and groups less directly tied to an action
may also obtain this status through one of two means-the "contest" or the "protest." A third party who can demonstrate an
adverse claim of title or interest in the particular land being considered may initiate a "contest" against another party's assertion
of rights to use that land. 76 On the other hand, a member of the
public without such a right or interest can still enter the decisionmaking process through an alternative mechanism, the "protest":
Where the elements of a contest are not present, any objection
raised by any person to any action proposed to be taken in any
proceeding before the Bureau will be deemed to be a protest
and such action thereon will be taken as is deemed to be
appropriate in the circumstances. 77
The right to protest is open-ended. No relationship between the
protestant 78 and the proposed action is necessary; nor is there any
limitation on the types of action that may be protested or the
reasons that may be raised. 79
The regulation, however, is also singularly uninformative as
to what consequences will flow from the protest. In the face of its
indeterminate directive to do "what is appropriate," the IBLA has
delineated strict procedures. The BLM must consider the points
raised in the protest and, if the BLM does not cancel or modify
the action in response, it must issue a decision to the protestant
80
dismissing the protest and indicating that an appeal is available.
This decision is part of the record of the case and not a mere ad
76. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-1 (1987). The rationale for the "contest" must be factual and
not shown on the BLM records. A hearing will be granted in contest actions, but not in
protest actions.
77. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-2 (1987) (emphasis added). If the pending action is the patenting
of a mining claim or a grazing decision, specialized regulations apply. Id. §§ 3872.1, 4160.2;
see also Lee Brothers Dredging Co., 79 I.B.L.A. 330, 333-34 (Mar. 30, 1984) (persons who
"protest" act as amicus curiae).
78. "Protestant" is the term used by the IBLA.
79. But see infra note 92 and accompanying text (failure to act cannot be the subject

of a protest).
80. Steinheimer Trust, 87 I.B.L.A. 308 (June 25, 1985); see also Texas Oil & Gas
Corp., 88 Interior Dec. 879, 58 I.B.L.A. 175 (1981); Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior
Dec. 165, 80 I.B.L.A. 64 (1984). This view was inherited from prior practice. See, e.g.,
Carver & Landstrom, supra note 35, at 59 n.60; Dorothy Bassie, 59 Interior Dec. 235

(1946).
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hoc rationale for the action. 8 More importantly, the dismissal
transforms the protestant into a "party to the case." The IBLA,
not the BLM, will then ascertain whether the second requirement
of the test for an appellant, that of being "adversely affected by
82
the decision," has been met.
Because the "protest" is the primary route for the public into
the process, its attributes should be delineated in detail. Unfortunately, no clear guidance on what constitutes a protest exists under
the regulations. 83 The IBLA has stated that not all comments
directed towards a public notice of an action must be treated as a
protest, although it has intimated that clear "objections" would
4
qualify
The lack of formality involved is underscored by instances in
which the IBLA almost waived the requirement that a protest be
filed prior to the consummation of the objectionable action. For
example, in.the Utah Wilderness Association decision,85 the IBLA
granted party status to the Utah Wilderness Association when the
Association, allegedly due to lack of notice, had not objected to a
particular decision to allow the drilling of an oil well.8 6 The Association had, however, requested notice of such proposed actions
and its members did use the affected lands. The Association also
had participated in other management decisions concerning the
area. This decision can best be reconciled with other holdings that
a pre-action protest is a firm prerequisite for an appeal by assuming
that the IBLA accepted the general position of the environmental
group and its avowed desire to protest all such activities as an
informal protest for purposes of determining party status.87
81. Lane County Audubon Soc'y, 55 I.B.L.A. 171 (June 11, 1981).
82. Texas Oil, 58 I.B.L.A. at 178-79; Utah Wilderness, 80 I.B.L.A. at 66-67.
83. By contrast, a "protest" of a resource management planning decision must contain specific details. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2 (1987). In the grazing arena, a protest may be
either oral or written and is triggered by a specific action of the BLM, namely a proposed
decision. Id. § 4160.2; see also International Paper, 98 I.B.L.A. 52 (June 5, 1987) (construing 43 C.F.R. § 5003.3) (establishing a time limit for timber sale protests).
84. Steinheimer Trust, 87 I.B.L.A. at 310; see also Animal Protection Inst. of Am.,
79 I.B.L.A. 94 (Feb. 17, 1984) (comments on environmental documents may be sufficient).
But see Mark S. Altman, 93 I.B.L.A. 265 (Aug. 28, 1986) (comments must be in the record).

85. 91 I.B.L.A. 124 (Mar. 19, 1986).
86. Id. at 128-29; see also California Ass'n of Four Wheel Drive Clubs, 30 I.B.L.A.
383 (June 10, 1977) (a group may appeal without formal protest on behalf of members who
use lands when that group participated in formulation of plan effectively amended by
decision).
87. For example, in Sierra Club, 84 I.B.L.A. 311 (Jan. 7, 1985), the IBLA held that
an environmental group could not use "surprise" as an excuse for its lack of a protest
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However, in addition to equating the group's past activities
with a protest, the Utah Wilderness case should also be viewed in
light of the BLM's recognition of the Association as "interested"
in the Applications for Permission to Drill ("APDs") and thus
entitled to direct, personal notice.88 Without such notice, the protest requirement dims in importance. Because the IBLA dismissed
the Association's appeal as moot, the chastisement of the BLM
for the failure to notify the group might have been the main purpose
of the decision.
The notice rationale could explain the convoluted reasoning
of the IBLA in Arnell Oil Co. 89 In that case, the BLM had authorized an oil and gas pipeline company to cross over lands leased
to another for oil and gas exploration. Although the pipeline rightof-way could not be issued if it interfered with the lease operations,
the leasing company claimed they had received no notice of the
right-of-way prior to issuance. The lessee requested that the BLM
reconsider the decision. While the request for reconsideration was
too late to be considered a protest, the IBLA suggested that the
lessee could appeal the denial of the request to reconsider.9"
In other situations, the IBLA has strictly required that a protest precede BLM activity. 91 The IBLA has narrowly construed
the scope of access in one additional aspect: the BLM must be
considering an action in order for a protest to be allowed. A failure
to act cannot be the subject of a protest. 92 The protest mechanism
cannot initiate enforcement or other BLM activity. The basic
scheme remains that any person may raise objections by way of a
protest only while an action is pending. After a decision is rendered, only a "party to the case adversely affected" may appeal.
before a mineral lease was issued because lease applications are noted on master plans and
other public documents in BLM offices. In Utah Wilderness, the BLM had provided greater
opportunities for public awareness of the drilling proposals. Utah Wilderness, 91 I.B.L.A.
at 128; see also id. at 126-27. Notices of the "Requests to Stake" drillsites had been
published in the local newspapers, although notices of the actual Applications for Permission to Drill had not been. The former actions are generally precursors of the latter.
88. Utah Wilderness, 91 I.B.L.A. at 128-29 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(f): The
BLM "will consult with ... appropriate interested parties.").
89. 95 I.B.L.A. 311 (Jan. 13, 1987).
90. Id. at 319; see also Peter Paul Groth, 99 I.B.L.A. 104 (Sept. 22, 1987); cf. Roy
Jones, 10 I.B.L.A. 112 (Mar. 9, 1973) (a mining claimant who had been notified of his
claim's invalidity by publication and certified letter sent to last known address may not
transform "final" decision into appealable one by "appealing" letter giving information on
the original decision).
91. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 84 I.B.L.A. 311, 318 (Nov. 12, 1985).
92. George Schultz, 94 I.B.L.A. 173 (Oct. 29, 1986).
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Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain when the BLM is no longer
merely contemplating an "action proposed to be taken." 93
In a manner similar to the IBLA's treatment of the necessity
of a protest in the absence of notice, concern for effective public
input has created another blurred and administratively troublesome concept: the distinction between a final and pending action.
Generally, an action is pending until the BLM has actually issued
or denied a use authorization such as a lease, right-of-way, drilling
permit, or timber contract. In accord with this view, the IBLA
found that preliminary indications of proposed actions, including
public notices, were not appealable, but only subject to protest. 94
Similarly, an environmental document prepared as a prerequisite
for a decision in compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 95 should not be subject to review
independent of a decision to act, but should enable those who
oppose the action to submit protests prior to the BLM implemen96
tation of the proposal.

The IBLA disagreed in Animal Protection Institute of America,97 holding that where an environmental assessment of an areawide decision is made, appeal of the assessment is not premature. 98
Nevertheless, the IBLA's reasoning would not authorize direct
appeals of environmental documents in all instances. The Board
observed that normally the action contemplated, not a conclusion
in an environmental assessment, has the potential to "adversely
93. 43 C.F.R. §§ 450-452 (1987).

94. Cascade Holistic Economic Consultants, 58 I.B.L.A. 332 (Oct. 12, 1982); see
also Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 65 I.B.L.A. 219 (July 9, 1982); International Paper Co., 98

I.B.L.A. 52 (June 5, 1987); Kenneth IV. Bosley, 99 I.B.L.A. 327, 332-34 (Oct. 29, 1987).
Other decisions are labelled interlocutory or final on minor differences. See, e.g., Franklin
Bell Real Estate Co., 93 I.B.L.A. 272 (Aug. 29, 1986). Because it is an absolute necessity
to appeal in a timely manner from an adverse, non-interlocutory decision, the linguistic
distinctions could be crucial. Cf. Inexco Oil Co., 93 I.B.L.A. 351, 353-54 (Sept. 15, 1986)

(an appeal must be made of a fact deemed erroneous even if the remainder of the decision
is favorable).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10 (1987) (defining
"environmental document").
96. NEPA requires that a "detailed statement" (commonly referred to as an Environmental Impact Statement or "EIS") accompany any "major federal action that significantly affects the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). In various such
documents, the BLM told the public that a protest may be raised thirty days after the filing
of the EIS. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, HIcKEY MOUNTAIN-TABLE MOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT RECORD OF DECISION AND FINAL EIS (May,

1987).
97. 79 I.B.L.A. 94 (Feb. 17, 1984).
98. Id. at 103-04.
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affect" a party. Therefore, it would be adequate to raise the insufficiency of the NEPA compliance in an appeal of the actual action. 99 However, more effective review was needed when the BLM
proposed to allow up to sixteen gas wells to be drilled over three
years in a wilderness study area also designated as a wild horse
range. The IBLA held that it would be impractical to require
appeals of each individual well approval, especially since the cumulative impact of drilling most disturbed the environmental
groups. 100 Therefore, the IBLA concluded that an "area-wide decision" to allow a program of drilling had been made without
preparing an environmental impact statement. The basis for this
decision, namely the BLM's environmental assessment, should be
subject to immediate appeal to enable review to have any meaning
and to avoid drilling before its review. 10 1 The IBLA noted that
nothing limited its authority to the review of only "final" decisions
of the BLM; it could thus intercede at any stage where there has
been "adverse affect.' 0 2 No APD could be granted before the
adequacy of the NEPA compliance was decided. 10 3 This stance
protects public input.
Another aspect of the process' promotion of citizen input
involves not the timing of appeals, but the second prong of the
regulatory test for standing, which requires that a party be "adversely affected by the decision." Although the IBLA acknowledged that standing for an administrative appeal need not be
equated with the judicial concept, it did follow the courts; it expanded the realm of "legally recognizable interests" to include the
"aesthetic, conservational and recreational."'04 However, the
IBLA does inquire into whether or not an "injury in fact" has
occurred to such an interest. Usually, it is sufficient that the protestant organization or a member thereof allege its use of the public
99. Id. at 101-02.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. at 102-04. The IBLA recognized that approval of an APD was, at that date,

a "full force and effect" decision. See infra note 109. Therefore, wells could be completed
before the IBLA could act. See Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 I.B.L.A. 124, 130 (Mar. 19,
1986). Reviewing the environmental document as a separate decision would avoid this,
because no APDs could be granted until NEPA is fulfilled. The same effect would occur
by holding that the dismissal of a protest and appeal thereof forbids further action on the

underlying decision. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
102. Animal Protection, 79 I.B.L.A. at 102-04.

103. Id. at 100.
104. Donald Pay, 85 I.B.L.A. 283 (Mar. 13, 1985) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 729 (1972)).
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lands involved. 10 5 The IBLA has also never employed corollaries
of the injury test such as a requirement that the injury 0be6 within
the "zone of interest" protected by the relevant statute.
C. The Effect of an Appeal
Increased access to the appeal process without an immediate
impact on land management would not be an appreciable gain for
the public. However, appeals do affect the BLM's ability to continue as it had determined to act. The BLM loses jurisdiction of
the matter appealed and cannot act, even to modify the decision
in a manner desired by the appellant, unless the IBLA approves
or remands the case. 10 7 More importantly, an appeal will stay the
effectiveness of the BLM decision in most instances:
Except as otherwise provided by law or other pertinent regulation, a decision will not be effective during the time in which
a person adversely affected may file a notice of appeal, and the
timely filing of a notice of appeal will suspend the effect of the
decision appealed from pending the decision on appeal. 0 8
Unless a regulation states otherwise, the mere filing of a paper
entitled "notice of appeal" is equivalent to a preliminary injunction
without proof of irreparable harm or likely success on the merits.
However, many activities frequently challenged by environmen105. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n, 82 I.B.L.A. 303 (Sept. 5, 1984); California
State Lands Comm'n, 58 I.B.L.A. 213 (Sept. 29, 1981) ("colorable" allegations of injury
suffice); see also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973); Bryant v. Yellen,
447 U.S. 352 (1980); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1762. But see infra note 268 (potential pitfalls
in the standing doctrine). For recent cases denying standing in addition to Donald Pay, in
which there was no allegation of use of the lands, see James W. Smith, 85 I.B.L.A. 237
(Mar. 4, 1985); Save Our Ecosystems, Inc., 85 I.B.L.A. 300 (Mar. 15, 1985); In re Thompson
Creek Timber Sale, 81 I.B.L.A. 242 (June 7, 1984); Blaine County Bd. of Comm'rs, 93
I.B.L.A. 155 (July 31, 1986); James M. Wright, 95 I.B.L.A. 387 (Feb. 24, 1987). In most
of these cases, the IBLA simply decided that no rational explanation of injury was articulated or existed.
106. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (reviving and explaining the doctrine espoused in Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
107. B.K. Killion, 90 I.B.L.A. 371 (Feb. 27, 1986); accord Gateway Coal Co., 84
I.B.L.A. 378 (Jan. 25, 1985) (analogous regulation of sister agency).
108. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a) (1987). When public interest dictates, the IBLA or Director
of OHA may place a decision in force immediately. Id.; see also id. § 4.477(b). Conversely,
on proper showings they, or the Secretary, may suspend certain full force and effect
decisions. See, e.g., id. §§ 2804.1(b), 2884.1, 316,5.4(c). The IBLA does not limit itself to
judicial tests for preliminary injunctions in these cases. Mark S. Altman, 93 I.B.L.A. 265,
265 n.1 (Aug. 28, 1986).
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talists were or are accorded "full force and effect" status during
the pendency of an appeal. 0

9

In some cases, however, the IBLA hinted that these "full
force and effect" exceptions to the normal stay could be undercut
by third party participants. 110 It has stated that if a third party
protest is filed, the BLM cannot implement its proposed action
during the thirty days following a dismissal of the protest or during
the pendency of any appeal that might be filed."' However, the
cases in which these "hints" appeared, as well as the cases cited
in support thereof, all dealt with decisions that would not have
2
been accorded full force and effect during an appeal."
With these types of actions, if the BLM had rendered decisions concurrently dismissing the protest and granting the requested authorization, an appeal of the protest dismissal would
effectively be an appeal of the actual implementing decision to
grant the authorization, which would properly be tolled by the
appeal. If the BLM separated the decisions, no practical change
would occur in the activity's status-it would have been stayed in
any case. However, parties would be able to appeal the implementing decision later, creating inefficiencies as causes of action
multiplied. If, however, the BLM must separate its decisions when
the implementing decision is one that would not be stayed by an
appeal, the tolling of its ability to act during adjudication of the
protest dismissal would not only be inefficient, but would also
profoundly change the system.
To allow a protestant to block otherwise operative decisions
undermines the regulatory scheme. Part of the reason to place a
decision in full force and effect is to enable a person objecting to
it to proceed directly to court." 3 If the Secretary decided on such
a procedure in a regulation, the IBLA should not countermand it
sub rosa.114 It should only act through a direct ruling on a motion
109. Decisions regarding the following are currently not automatically stayed and
therefore are in full force and effect during the pendency of an appeal: Oil and gas
operations, 43 C.F.R. § 3165.4(c) (1987); rights-of-way including those for oil and gas
pipelines, id. § 2804.1; mining claim plans of operation, but only if appealed by someone
other than the operator, id. § 3809.4; forest management, id. § 5003.1 (1986); and certain
recreational permits, id. § 8372.6(b).
110. Sierra Club, Or. Chapter, 87 I.B.L.A. I (May 17, 1985); Sierra Club, 84 I.B.L.A.
311 (Jan. 7, 1985).

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b) (1987).

114. Such an action by the IBLA parallels the holding of Animal ProtectionInstitute
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that the decision either be stayed or implemented pending appeal.
In essence, by attempting to foreclose BLM actions, even in full
force and effect situations, the stay provisions do what the IBLA
says the provisions cannot do: force the BLM to provide affirmative relief." 5 In fact, however, the IBLA has allowed the continuance of an activity that would not generally be stayed by an
appeal while adjudicating a protestant's case.116 Nothing expressly
reconciles this treatment with the positions espoused in the cases.
In many situations, the IBLA does circumscribe BLM behavior to facilitate public input. This is obvious in the definition of
standing employed as well as the flexible approach to defining
protests and decisions. However, as will be discussed below, the
IBLA has not otherwise been a direct activist in reviewing BLM
decisions.117 Even this tendency toward inactivism, however, is
consistent with adoption of the interest representation model of
admininstrative law.

IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTEREST
REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE

BLM

PROCESS

Although adjudicators rarely articulate the theories influencing
their behavior, commentators often attempt to do so. Often, a
compulsion to rename concepts accompanies these efforts.118 This

article will refer to two now-familiar models of decisionmaking;
of America, 79 I.B.L.A. 94 (Feb. 17, 1984), which blocked otherwise full force and effect
decisions by requiring a separate appeal on the sufficiency of NEPA compliance before the
action could be authorized. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
115. See Prima Exploration, Inc., 96 I.B.L.A. 80 (Mar. 2, 1987). An oil and gas
lessee was denied a suspension of operations and appealed. The lessee sought a ruling that
no drilling was required to maintain the lease in the interim. The IBLA held that 43 C.F.R.
§ 4.21(a) (1987) does not require the agency to take positive action for the benefit of the
appellant. Id. In other words, the stay of the decision means the status quo is maintained;
absent an approved suspension of operations, drilling would be necessary. By analogy,
absent a successful protest, the BLM should be able to act-unless the implementing
decision itself is appealed by a "party," which would then invoke the relevant stay
provisions.
116. Utah Wilderness Soc'y, 91 I.B.L.A. 124, 130 (Mar. 19, 1986); Colorado Open
Space Council, 73 I.B.L.A. 226 (May 31, 1983); Western Gas Supply Co., 86 I.B.L.A. 258
(May 8, 1985); California Wilderness Coalition, 98 I.B.L.A. 314 (July 30, 1987).
117. For a discussion of standard of review, see infra notes 202, 204 and accompanying text.
118. See Elliot, The Dis-IntegrationofAdministrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro,
92 YALE L.J. 1523, 1524-25 (1983).

1988]

Public Land Appeals

489

namely, interest representation and comprehensive rationality. 119
Moreover, no attempt will be made to generalize broadly about
"Administrative Law" in the upper case; the law examined is that
which has evolved to control appeals of informal BLM decisions.120

Nevertheless, one working hypothesis emerges: similiar procedures would be natural for agencies that administer similiar stat-

utes. Procedure and substance frequently intertwine. 2 1 Therefore,
the first step in this analysis is to isolate the relevant characteristics
of the statutes administered by the BLM in these informal proceedings. The crucial characteristic is that they tend to endow the

119. Professor Stewart posed the "interest representation model" of administrative
law as "the provision of a surrogate political process to insure the fair representation of a
wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision." Stewart, supra
note 7, at 1670. Professor Diver summarizes the four steps of the "comprehensive rationality" paradigm:
First, the decisionmaker must specify the goal he seeks to attain. Second, he
must identify all possible methods of reaching his objective. Third, he must
evaluate how effective each method will be in achieving the goal. Finally, he
must select the alternative that will make the greatest progress towards the
desired outcome.
Diver, supra note 10, at 396. He cautions that while increased participation may be present
in this mode of decisionmaking, it and the interest representation model are not necessarily
compatible. Id. at 422-28. Other commentators have noted these two modes of administrative activity, albeit under different labels. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1495-1500;
Reich, Public Administration and PublicDeliberation:An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J.
1617 (1985).
120. Cf. Elliot, supra note 118, at 1528; Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition:A
Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 120 (1977) (querying
whether a uniform field of administrative law exists or simply law for each agency); Stewart,
supra note 7, at 1670 n.5.
121. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectiveson Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
771, 786 (1975) (administrative law must follow substantive law); see also Rabin, supra
note 120, at 143-44 (suggesting that the BLM and the Forest Service might have different
procedures than the National Park Service, which faces fewer conflicting goals); cf. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Continuing Relations in the Administrative Process,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (asserting that the Forest Service in the pre-1970's did not
act in traditional APA mode, but employed a managerial model and that further research
on current tendencies is needed). A preliminary examination does reveal a similarity
between the Forest Service and the BLM. The Forest Service administers statutes that,
like those of the BLM, present problems of polycentricity and multiple criteria. See generally Coggins & Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the FederalPublic Lands,
60 OR. L. REv. 59, 143-55 (1981); Coggins & Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Planning
on the Public Lands, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 411 (1982). The Forest Service has a structured
review process with public participation allowed. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(a) (1987). The Forest
Service decisions are publicized. Id. § 211.18(a), Environmentalists avail themselves of
these provisions. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 80 I.B.L.A. 251, 254-55 (May 2, 1984) (recounting
of history). For a further testing of the hypothesis that procedure reflects substance, see
infra notes 185, 214.
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agency with discretion to choose among conflicting
societal values
22
without concrete congressional direction.1

A. The Nature of DiscretionAvailable under the FLPMA and

the Mineral Leasing Act
Most of the decisions subject to informal adjudication involve
rights and authorizations pursuant to the FLPMA and the Mineral
Leasing Act. 123 For the leasing system, issues relating to oil and
gas will be used as a microcosm of the problems dealt with by the
Act. 2 4 Both of these acts delegate policymaking discretion to the
BLM.'25 Despite recommendations to the contrary, the FLPMA
did not dictate concrete decisionmaking criteria. Similiarly, the
basic discretion inherent in the Mineral Leasing Act, summarized
by the phrase "to lease or not to lease," includes the authority to
consider conflicting uses. Both the FLPMA and the Mineral Leas122. Such statutes have been referred to as "thematic," Shapiro, supra note 4, at
1505-07 (listing "considerations" but providing no weighing factors), and "aspirational,"
Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1978). Stewart delineated two
sources of discretion: Congress could freely "endow an agency with plenary responsibilities" and allow the agency full discretion, or it could "issue directives that are intended to
control the agency's choice among alternatives but that, because of their generality, ambiguity, or-vagueness, do not clearly determine choices in particular cases." Stewart, stepra
note 7, at 1676 n.25. The latter example describes most of the congressional guidance given
the BLM.
123. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended by the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-256 (codified at 30 US.C.
§§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); see also Verkuil, supra note 4, at 768 (mineral leasing
as informal action).
124. Oil and gas leasing is chosen because the 1977 amendments to the coal leasing
provisions in the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90
Stat. 1087, Aug. 4, 1976, and the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1114 and in scattered
sections of 30 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), created specialized procedures for coal, See
generally Sturges, supra note 23, at 49-53. Oil shale and other minerals are leased less
frequently.
125. Professor Koch defines five types of discretion. See Koch, Judicial Review of
Administrative Discretion, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986). "Policymaking discretion"
exists when an agency may choose alternative actions in furthering societal goals. Id. at
483-87. The BLM's discretion might also be "numinous" in Koch's typology. Such discretion exists when there is no "right" or "wrong" answer to a problem. Koch's example is
whether the criterion for "peanut butter" should be that a product be 87% or 90% peanuts.
Id. at 502-06. Some might differ and maintain that there could be a "right" answer to the
BLM's task of ascertaining whether a particular tract of land is better suited to backpackers
or oil rig roughnecks, but this would be determined by a value choice, not by scientific
verity.
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ing Act force the BLM to allocate resources between disparate
demands.
The Mineral Leasing Act provides, as to oil and gas, that the
Secretary of Interior "may" lease lands for oil and gas exploration.' 26 The permissive language grants the Secretary the right to

refrain from leasing; environmental concerns could justify the refusal. The passage of NEPA in 1969 enlivened the consideration

of environmental values. 127 However, even before NEPA, the Secretary could decide to devote certain lands to uses that would

preclude oil and gas development. 128 Moreover, the BLM has the
authority and obligation to consider all impacted resources and, if
necessary, to employ environmental safeguards if it issues a
lease. 29
The BLM may take measures to mitigate impacts because the

power to grant or not grant an authorization or suspension includes
the power to reasonably condition the grant. 13 0 In fact, the BLM
may issue an oil and gas lease that expressly reserves a right to
veto all possible future development if it finds specified thresholds
have been crossed.1 3' More importantly, even if the BLM issues a
126. 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1982); see also McDonald v. Clark, 771 F.2d 460, 463 (10th
Cir. 1985) (leasing held to be discretionary even after offers received); McCarty, A View of
the Decision-Making Process within the Department of Interior,12 RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 269, 303 (1967) (decision to lease tract is a policy decision, but decision as to whom
to award the lease wholly an issue of law). Two methods of leasing existed until recent
amendments: competitive leasing by bidding for lands within a "known geological structure," and non-competitive leasing for other lands. Non-competitive leasing may be pursuant to the simultaneous oil and gas leasing system-popularly known as the "lottery"or pursuant to a request to lease filed "over the counter" depending on the status of the
lands. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 3110, 3120 (1987). The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing Reform Act, part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987), changed this procedure. All leases are to be first offered
competitively. If a lease receives no acceptable bids, then for two years it will be available
to the first qualified party who applies for a lease. If after two years there is no lease, the
process begins again with bidding.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 14546 (9th Cir. 1973).
128. See Learned v. Watt, 528 F. Supp. 980, 981-82 (D. Wyo. 1981) (secretarial
memorandum foreclosing oil and gas leasing in an area of scenic beauty held to be valid);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (discretion to lease or not lease exercisable by regulation); Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
129. See Morton, 493 F.2d at 145-46.
130. Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915-16 (D. Wyo. 1985); see also
generally Pring, "Power to Spare": Conditioning Federal Resource Leases to Protect
Social, Economic, and Environmental Values, 14 NAT. RESouRCEs LAW. 305 (1981).
131. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982) (nonimpairment-of-wilderness stipulation can foreclose development); Sierra Club v. Peterson,
717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (presumes validity of general "no surface occupancy"
stipulation that prevents drilling if later environmental analysis reveals unacceptable im-
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standard lease without reserving veto power, the BLM retains the
right to examine and condition proposed activities before surface
disturbance begins. In such cases, the BLM may not destroy the
granted right and must have a reasonable basis for its requirements. 132 One technique to assure such control is that the developer submit an application for permission to drill for approval
33
before proceeding. The BLM then sets appropriate terms.
Policy choices abound in leasing actions, both in decisions on
the propriety of leasing at all and in decisions about stipulations
or permit conditions. Each may increase the cost or difficulty of
mineral recovery. Proponents of various values have the choice of
congressional directives. Mineral lessees and potential lessees cite
the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, a hortatory act that
embraces a policy of fostering energy and strategic mineral independence. 134 Persons asserting other interests rely on additional
35
distinct policies in the BLM's organic act, the FLPMA.1
This later Act did not embrace the philosophy of the PLLRC
in giving and demanding delineation of policy. The PLLRC recommended that comprehensive planning be undertaken, with Congress providing a clear set of goals. The public lands would be
managed for the maximum net public benefit. Certain lands would
be devoted to primary uses. In case of conflicts, the BLM would
6 These recfollow value determinants specified by CongressY.1
ommendations were in accord with then current administrative
law philosophy.1 37 A disenchantment had set in with the New Deal
pacts); Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1527-30 (9th Cir. 1988). Although a non-developable oil and gas lease may seem a contradiction in terms, prospective oil and gas lessees

may make independent business judgments on the value of a conditional lease before
signing. Moreover, they may appeal to the IBLA to ascertain the reasonableness of the
stipulation. Absent appeal, they should be bound to their contracts. See Pring, supra note
130; Noble, Oil and GasLeasing on PublicLands: NEPA Gets Lost in the Shuffle, 6 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 117 (1982).
132. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414; Conner, 836 F.2d at 1530.
133. Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(ability to regulate for "conservation" in statute includes protection of all natural resources,
not simply oil and gas); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3162.3-1, 3162.3-3 (1987); see also generally Laitos
& Westfall, Government Interference with PrivateInterests in Public Resources, 11 HARV.

ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1987) (potential limitations of regulation).
134. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982).
135. See infra notes 141-42 (delineating various policy goals contained in the
FLPMA).
136. ONE THIRD, supra note 6, at 45-48. The PLLRC provided Congress with a

non-exhaustive list of diverse value preferences. Congress could have directed the BLM
to favor regional economic growth or values that do not have a market price. Another
suggested guideline was to require the BLM to adopt the option that was least harmful to
the environment.
137. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1693-1702 (general history).
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concept of broadly entrusting the "public interest" to agency determination, often through adjudication, and with the conviction
that agency expertise could function as a cure-all for social ills. 38
Not only were critics urging agencies to employ rulemaking, 139 but
they called upon Congress to provide better guidance to
agencies. 140
Nevertheless, Congress infused the FLPMA with contradiction. The Act's policy section articulates the mutually exclusive
goals of environmental protection on the one hand, 141 and the
enhancement of the production of resources on the other. 142 Nat138. The New Deal model of an agency deferred to agency expertise and sought to
insulate the agency from central policy control, isolate it from the executive, and limit
judicial oversight of its activities. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1471-78 (1980). Stewart argues that a disavowal
of an objective "public interest" and unguided agency expertise transformed administrative
law. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1676-78. Even the vanguard of the New Deal bemoaned
flaws with its model, especially "capture" of agencies by the regulated. See D. LANDIS,
REPORT ON REGULATOR AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT (1960); D. LANDIS, THE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24, 68-70 (1938); McFarland, Landis Report: The Voice of
One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REv. 373 (1961); W. BOYER, BUREAUCRACY ON
TRIAL (1964).
139. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the desirability of
required rulemaking for the BLM). For discussions of general rulemaking preference, see
Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 138, at 1474; Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the
PoliticalProcess, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-98 (1975); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971); Nassikab, Energy, The Environment and the Administrative Process, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 165 (1965); Koslow, StandardlessAdministrative Adjudication, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (1970). But see Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965)
(fair administration is not the product of the choice between rulemaking and adjudication;
both have problems and rulemaking proponents overstate their case); see also Diver, supra
note 10, at 430 (incrementalist model of policy formulation superior in certain circumstances); Strauss, supra note 23 (discussed supra note 39).
140. See, e.g., Long, Arbitrary Administrative Decisions: The Need for Clearer
Congressionaland AdministrativePolicies, 47 NEB. L. REV. 459 (1968); Jaffe, The Effective
Limits of the Administrative Process:A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954); see
also Diver, supra note 10 (one prerequisite for use of the "comprehensive rationality"
model was Congress' increased specification of aims as it created single-purpose agencies,
such as the EPA); Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 138, at 1471-78 (the 1970 Clean Air
Act broke with tradition when it set ends-forcing targets and required some uniform
standards, but it stayed with the New Deal model for implementation).
141. Congress declared that the policy behind the FLPMA was that:
[T]he public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve
and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide
food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide
for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982).
142. Congress also delineated a policy that "the public lands be managed in a manner
which recognizes the Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and
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urally, these goals cannot both be met on each parcel of land.143
Other sections of the FLPMA, such as those dealing with dispositions, similarly contain laundry lists of potentially contradictory
144
considerations.
Moreover, the FLPMA expresses the policy that "management [of public lands] be on the basis of multiple use and sustained
yield unless otherwise specified by law."'145 To some extent, this
mirrors prior statutes that required "multiple use management," a
criterion that many felt was meaningless. 4 6 However, in addition
to exhortations to employ these concepts, the planning procedure
of the FLPMA requires that the BLM "consider" both present and
future uses of the lands as well as relative scarcity of the valuable
attributes of the lands. The Act also requires "a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic and other sciences," "giv[ing] priority
to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental
concern," and "provid[ing] for compliance with applicable pollution control laws."' 147 These mandatory provisions, according to
fiber from the public lands including implementation of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act
of 1970 .... " Id. § 1701(a)(12).
143. State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03 (D. Utah 1979).
144. See 43 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1986) (sales); id. § 1716(a) (exchanges), discussed in
Anderson, PublicLand Exchanges, Sales, and Purchases under the FederalLand Policy
and Management Act of 1976, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 657; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1719(b) (Supp.
IV 1986) (governing the conveyance of reserved mineral interests when "the reservation of
mineral rights by the United States is interfering with or precluding appropriatenonmineral
development of the land and such development is a more beneficial use of the land than
mineral development." (emphasis added)).
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982). The Act further states that "in the development
and revision of land use plans, the Secretary shall ... use and observe the principles of
multiple use and sustained yield set forth in this and other applicable law." Id. § 1712(c);
see also id. § 1702(c) ("multiple use" defined); id. § 1702(h) ("sustained yield" defined).
146. Prior acts using such terms included the Classification and Multiple Use Act of
1960,43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1964) (expired in 1970 pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1418) (BLM),
and the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982) (Forest Service). For views that either or both statutes were not effective, see ONE THIRD, supra note
6, at 43, 45; Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach to
Forest Land Management, 7 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 473 (1967); Reich, The Public and the
Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 386 (1962); Comment, Managing FederalLands:
Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787, 788 (1973); McCloskey, Natural
Resources-National Forests-The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 41 On. L.
REV. 49 (1961); Strand, Statutory Authority Governing Management of National Forest
System-Timefor a Change, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 479, 495-97 (1974). But see Coggins,
Of Succotash Syndrome and Vacuous Platitudes:The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustainable Yield" for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229, 243-50 (1981) (past
cases have usually been deferential to agencies, although there are some hints that due
consideration and rationality are required); P. CULHANE, supra note 2, at 326-27 (the term
"multiple use" is not vague to professional land managers).
147. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(2), (3), (8) (1982).
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one commentator, contain judicially enforceable "law to apply"
and hence add "bite" to the Act.148 However, although these terms
may influence BLM activity, they are primarily procedural checks,
not substantive determinants. The BLM may decide as it desires
so long as it follows the proper decisionmaking paths, with only
the arbitrary and capricious standard to curb directly its substantive choice.149 Nevertheless, the requirement of specific procedures and the forced consideration of diverse criteria can indirectly
50
moderate BLM activity, because process controls can be potent.
Congress thus gave the BLM broad management authority
with little but process requirements to guide it. Despite the tendency of courts to assume jurisdiction under the Administrative
Procedures Act by refusing to find decisions "committed to agency
discretion," effective substantive review may elude the courts.' 5'
Congress did attempt to retain some control over various major
allocative actions; it provided for house vetoes of certain decisions
52
on withdrawals, sales, and land management.
148. See Coggins, Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA and
the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L.-Nw. SCH. L., LEwIs & CLARK 1, 48-65 (1983)
(although there is some latitude granted to the agency, the heavier emphasis in the FLPMA
is on preservation); see also Coggins & Evans, supra note 121 (citing as "law to apply"

the statutory command to "take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection." 43
U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982)). Unfortunately, the terms "unnecessary" and "undue," just like
the concept of "impairing" an area's suitability for wilderness, are subject to wide interpretation. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802.05(1), 3809.05(k) (1987); State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 995, 1003-09 (D. Utah 1979); Norman G. Lavery, 96 I.B.L.A. 294 (Mar. 31, 1987);
Southwest Resource Council, 94 Interior Dec. 56, 96 I.B.L.A. 105 (Mar. 10, 1987).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
150. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (failure
to provide public participation required restoring land to prior status); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983) (regulation is binding until repealed by
APA notice and comment procedure). For the recognition that process controls impact
public land law, see Coggins, The PublicInterest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on
the Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 Pun. LAND L. REV. 1, 24-27 (1983); Wilkinson, supra
note 13, at 6. For general findings that procedural requirements to consider various factors
can influence decisionmaking, see Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerationsand
Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 659 (1972); Hammond,
Embedding Policy Statements in Statutes: Perspectives on the Genesis of a New Public
Law Jurispudence, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & Con'. L.J. 325, 345-48 (1982).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982); see also Morrison, The Administrative Procedures Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. RaV. 253 (1986) (courts narrowly
construe the avenues agencies could use to avoid participation and scrutiny); Note, Sales
of Public Land: A Problem in Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Action,
96 HARV. L. Ray. 927 (1983) (if agency gives paper service to criteria, judicial review
would be ineffective).
152. See 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982) (prospective sales of tracts exceeding 2,500
acres); id. § 1714(c)(1) (withdrawals of 5,000 acres or more); id. § 1712(e)(2) (management
decisions affecting 100,000 or more acres and precluding one or more primary uses for two
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Unfortunately, these provisions are probably unconstitutional
under recent precedent. 153 In a search for alternative sources of
restraint, some commentators have urged .applying the theories of
communal ownership or the public trust doctrine, but it is doubtful
that such ambiguous standards could meaningfully or substantively
abridge the BLM's discretion except in the most egregious
situations. 154
Discretion, however, need not be scorned as a concept in and
of itself. Arguably, the legal system could not exist without it. 155
There are a number of compelling reasons for granting administrative agencies significant discretion. First, agency personnel can
provide crucial professional knowledge and initiative. 15 6 Second,
Congress often lacks the expertise to define national policy completely and cannot devote sufficient time to respond
to or supervise
57
either the regulated populace or the agencies.
Further, Congress often cannot politically balance the diverse
demands of society. It delegates broadly or with conflicting language in order to avoid stalemates and respond in some manner
to a perceived necessity for legislation. 5 In essence, Congress
or more years); see also Dominick & Crook, Title II of FLPMA: Public Land Law Reform
or an Invitation to BureaucraticOverkill, 21 ARIz. L. Rv. 329, 346 (1979).
153. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); cf.
Glicksman, supra note 13, at 33-64 (discussing Chadha in regard to the FLPMA).
154. For general background on the public trust doctrine and arguments as to its
efficacy, see The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A
Symposium, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 181 (1980); Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Sovereign Immunity in Natural Resource: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L.
REv. 631, 643 n.75, 644 n.76 (1986) (contains a detailed bibliography). For discussions of
other conceptual frameworks, see Juergensmeyer & Wadley, Common Lands Concept: A
"Commons" Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361
(1974) (communal ownership concept as potential base for environmental law); Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, andInherently PublicProperty, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 711 (1986) (prescription and custom as substitute for vague public trust).
155. See Davis, DiscretionaryJustice, 23 J. LEGAL EDuc. 56, 58 (1970); see also
Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747.
156. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the IdealAdministrator,86 HARV. L. RsV. 1183 (1973)
(agencies can provide creative impetus to help solve problems). Moreover, despite em.
ployee tendencies to identify with constituents, many BLM and Forest Service employees
do bring professionalism and pride to their management duties. Reich, The Law of the
PlannedSociety, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1262 (1966) (Forest Service); P. CULHANE, supra note
2, at 325-29 (BLM employees are professional and not captured by any one group); Bradley
& Ingram, supra note 47, at 509; Coggins, supra note 146, at 238. But see Coggins, The
Law of Public Rangeland Management III: A Survey of Creeping Regulation on the
Periphery, 1934-1982, 13 ENVT'L L. 295, 364 (1983) (BLM failed to achieve
professionalism).
157. See supra note 138 (discussing the New Deal model); see also Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47'YALE L.J. 577 (1938) (need realistic consideration of administrative discretion in actual governmental conditions).
158. See Fuchs, Introduction:Administrative Agencies and the Energy Problem, 47
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passes the dilemma to an agency. 15 9 This is not a perfect solution.

Agencies left foundering are subject to usurpation both by those
regulated 160 and by the courts.' 6' However, in the absence of a

consensus that will force agency action in one direction, there may
be no rational alternative.

62 Methods

channel the exercise of discretion.

63

must therefore be created to

IND. L.J. 606, 608 (1972) (broad delegations arise from urgency); Freedman, Crisis and
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); Ackerman &
Hassler, supra note 138, at 1509-13 (the 1970 amendments of the Clean Air Act abdicated
Congress' function to reconsider basic policy premises, partially because of scarce time
and its staff's accessibility to divergent competing interest groups); see also Stewart, supra
note 7, at 1693-97.
159. As Professor Freedman warns:
Yet when Congress has failed to adopt a set of social preferences for resolving
such fundamental and complex issues as typically lie behind broad delegations
of power, an administrative agency, itself now exposed to the conflicting political forces that led Congress to shirk from a decisive response in the first
instance, can hardly be expected to do better.
Freedman, supra note 158, at 1054; see also Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 121, at 77879.
160. Usurpation by the regulated is referred to as "capture" and has been explained
in various ways. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 156, at 1238-39 (reflects a desire to yield
toward the status quo); Boyer, Alternatives to Adminstrative Trial-type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 122-25,
141-45 (1972) ("insider perspective" links agencies to Congress and constituencies for
support). But see infra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the value of cooperation
between agencies and their constituents). For an empirical view of the phenomenon in the
BLM, see P. CULHANE, supra note 2, at 186-204, 218-29; Jaffe, supra note 140, at 110910.
161. See generally Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity,
42 VA. L. REV. 23, 35 (1956). For more particular examples, see generally Diver, supra
note 10, especially at 413-15 (Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), was a judicial resolution of seemingly irreconcilable conflicts by providing the
necessary value judgment to enable synoptic analysis); Murphy, The National Environmental PolicyAct and the Licensing Process:EnvironmentalMagna CartaorAgency Coup
de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963, 985-90 (1972).
162. Fuchs, supra note 158, at 608; Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative
Effect: An Analysis and a Proposalfor Participation, 1986 DuKE L.J. 346, 360-62 (an
ambiguous statute carries with it an implicit delegation ofrulemaking authority). To contrast
with the "thematic" or broadly delegatory statute, Ackerman and Hassler posit the agencyforcing statute, which directs policy in a certain direction but requires the agency to use
its expertise in a careful policy appraisal before the congressional initiative becomes a
regulation and thus law. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 138, at 1556-65. The FLPMA is
generally not agency-forcing in regard to land management, except for some agenda-forcing
provisions with time frames for some activities, such as withdrawal and wilderness reviews.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(c)(2), 1782(a) (1982). Compare the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (especially
§§ 1258, 1260, 1265) with 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982) (FLPMA's policy section) and id.
§ 1782(c) (FLPMA's admonition to "prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands
and their resources or to afford environmental protection.").
163. The control of discretion has been described as the current "major theme" of
administrative law. See Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, and Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447,

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 12:465

B. The Nature of Disputes Arising Under the FLPMA and the
Mineral Leasing Act
For any given area of a public land, there is a large pool of
potential users. A lumber company may desire to log; a mining
company may desire to develop a mining claim; an oil and gas
company may desire a new lease, well, or pipeline; t64 a developer
may desire to build a road for access to its project. 6 5 Such an
area, of course, may also support deer, elk or grizzly bears, contain
unspoiled vistas or opportunities for primitive recreation, provide
watershed protection, or in other ways serve environmental, recreational, or commercial needs in its undeveloped state. Clashes
are inevitable because all the demands are dependent on the same
resource and are, to greater or lesser extents, mutually
incompatible.
The resultant conflicts are not merely between development
and recreation, but often pit recreationists against other recreationists and commercial interests against other commercial interests. Backpackers and preservationists deplore recreational offroad vehicles. 166 Professional hunting guides and other touristrelated business owners as well as ranchers who graze cattle on
lands slated for development object to plans that would interfere
with their uses. 67 Therefore, even if an absolute value priority
such as economic development or recreational enjoyment was
68
available to the BLM, the answer would not be clear.
The problems confronting the BLM are those of allocating a
scarce resource. Any allocation it may make will create reverberations for numerous other potential claimants to the resource. For
example, an oil and gas rig could displace wildlife and disturb
hikers. If the BLM limits drilling to certain seasons to mitigate
488-92 (1986); see also Stewart, supranote 7, at 1676-88 (historical treatment of discretion);
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 9, 10 (2d ed. 1979).
164. See supra notes 126, 133 and accompanying text (discussions of leasing authority
and regulation of drilling activities respectively); 30 U.S.C. § 226 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(leasing authority); id. § 185 (authority for oil and gas pipelines).
165. See 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
166. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983).
167. See, e.g., Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agric., 613 F.
Supp. 1182 (D. Wyo. 1985), aff'd, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987) (a named plaintiff and
primary witness against drilling was a hunting guide).
168. Protestants against BLM actions also include direct competitors of the applicant.
See, e.g., Western Gas Supply Co., 86 I.B.L.A. 258 (May 8, 1985).
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these impacts, the economic feasibility of drilling would be altered.
A company might forego drilling and thus, unbeknownst to all, a
major field might remain undiscovered. The scenario could therefore be stretched out to include impacts to other regions that now
must be drilled or to the effects of higher petroleum prices. Conversely, unrestrained impacts to wildlife could not only detract
from the enjoyment and livelihoods of many, but could affect the
survival of a species that would have provided insight to a researcher on a fundamental problem. Each proposal for resource
use or non-use creates externalities. Because the rivals do not
desire the same end result, such as efficient recovery of oil and
gas, the problems are less tractable than when a community of
interest may be invoked. 169
The nature of the decision is hence polycentric: it is "a situation of interacting points.' 170 A polycentric task is one in which
the disposition of a part has implications for the proper disposition
of every other part.171 Most environmental disputes have polycentric characteristics. Of necessity, the allocation of scarce resources
requires economic and other tradeoffs. Numerous relevant variables must be considered, often with the necessity of predicting
172
impacts from possible courses of action amidst uncertainty.
Another aspect of the BLM's difficulties related to polycentricity, conceptually distinct though often found in the same problems, is the dilemma posed by multiple criteria being available to
the decisionmaker. 173 In essence, each allocation encompasses a
planning decision, but no value has been identified by Congress
as being authoritative in ordering the result. 174 Resolving tasks that
are polycentric or that contain multiple criteria creates special
problems.
169. Fuller, supra note 9, at 381 (adjudication works best when community of purpose
is present); Dorfman, The Technical Basisfor Decision-Making, in THE GOVERNANCE OF

COMMON PROPERTY RESouRcEs 383, 387 (E. Haefle ed. 1974) (it is harder to resolve
common problems in "asymmetric" situations where externalities differ for each user).
170. Fuller, supra note 9, at 394-95.
171. Id.; see also Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645 (1982) ("Polycentricity is the property of

a complex problem with a number of subsidiary problem 'centers,' each of which is related
to the others, such as the solution to each depends on the solution to all others.").
172. Boyer, supra note 160, at 117-19.

173. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 424.
174. See Reich, supra note 156, at 1234-35. (administrative law, by using phrase

"public interest," creates the myth that allocation and planning decisions are objective;
value choices permeate decisions); see also Landstrom, supra note 2, at 375-76 (describing
the nature of BLM's problem without use of terminology).
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C. Administrative Difficulties Resultingfrom the Adjudicator
Problems
The polycentric and multiple criteria decisions before the
BLM in informal adjudication cannot be resolved by viewing agencies as implementors of powers narrowly delegated by Congressan early characterization of agencies often analogized to a transmission belt. 17- However, the analogy cannot work when Congress
refuses to define policies. Similiarly, because values collide, many
commentators cannot accept that the BLM has any peculiar
"agency expertise" to balance the issues with scientific efficiency,
as New Dealers viewed the role of agencies. 76 A different model
of agency action and its complementary procedures is necessary.
This need is heightened by the nature of the decisions confronting the BLM, and thus the IBLA on appeal, which, in the
words of the late Professor Fuller, strain "the limits of adjudication.' 1 77 The rationale behind this view is the identification of a
particular type of participation as the hallmark of adjudication.
The ability to present proofs and reasoned arguments on behalf of
one's desired outcome typifies adjudication. 178 A BLM informal
adjudicatory decision could impact vacationers, biological researchers, mineral developers, archaelogists, and numerous others. Obviously, it is impossible to identify all the potential parties
affected by a proposed resource allocation, much less to afford
179
each of them the necessary participation rights.
Fuller's view, however, is not unanimously accepted. Professor Fiss counters that Fuller inappropriately concentrates on the
individuals affected by adjudication, rather than emphasizing the
175. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1684.
176. Id.; see also J. MASHAW, DuE PRocEss IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 15-22

(1985); Bradley & Ingram, supra note 47, at 509-13 (professionalism alone will not solve
the BLM's problems).
177. Fuller, supra note 9, at 400-04; see also Boyer, supra note 160 (trial-type
hearings unsuited to similiar problems); Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the
Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. R'v. 845, 853 (1975) (trials not suited to advance
substantive and distributive justice).
178. Fuller, supra note 9, at 364.
179. For decisions that openly involve planning, namely developing Resource Management Plans, a different system for appeals exists than for an informal adjudicatory
decision. Protests are made to the Director of the BLM rather than to the "independent"
IBLA. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.52 (1987). Additionally, Congress explicitly mandated public participation in this situation. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f) (1982); see also supra note 52.
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pinnacle-the judge. 180 From Fiss's perspective, adjudication becomes the social process by which judges give meaning to society's
public values. Representative spokespeople would therefore be
sufficient to enable the adjudicator to approach a polycentric task,
so long as the full range of interests is represented. 18 ' Therefore,
an internalization of the interest representation model by the IBLA
is understandable. The decisions before it require a balancing of
societal goals and one way to do so is to broaden the agency's
information base.
The balancing process is perhaps more akin to the traditional
concept of legislative action than to the judicial stereotype. Rulemaking would be the APA equivalent for agencies.1 82 Most rulemaking requires public participation at the very least by notice
and comment procedures to ensure that affected parties can inform
the agency of their views.183 This requirement is sufficient to provide "due process" in the legislative realm.184 However, it would
be awkward to apply notice and comment procedures each time
someone desired to use the public lands. On the other hand, it
might be impossible for the BLM to develop through rulemaking
180. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978-Forward:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 41-44 (1979).

181. Id.; see also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1297 (1976) (new model of litigation for structural reform of judicial institutions). But see Eisenberg, supra note 9 (Chayes' model is not adjudication, but a consultative process); Eisenberg & Yeasell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980) (institutional lawsuits differ from traditional
litigation mostly in substance, not in procedure or remedy). For views that agencies and
courts must confront such problems, see K. DAvis, supra note 163, § 10:3; Fletcher, supra
note 171.
182. The APA defines rulemaking as the process of making or amending a "rule,"
which in turn is defined as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1982).
183. Section 553 of the APA requires notice and opportunity for comment on a
regulation if the organic statute does not require such regulations to be promulgated after
a hearing on the record, in which case even more detailed procedures must be followed.
Id. § 553. At least in the past, an argument could be made that the BLM need not comply
with these requirements. See supra notes 41, 48 and accompanying text. Additionally,
"interpretive" rules are not subject to notice and comment procedures. See Saunders, supra
note 162, at 358 (difficulties delineating binding "legislative" rules from non-binding "interpretative" rules).
184. Legislative "due process" does not require strict control of the information
directed to legislators. They may base their decisions on any available information so long
as some rational basis for the legislation exists. Hahn, ProceduralAdequacy in Administrative Decision Making, Pt. 1, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 477-82 (1978) [hereinafter Hahn
pt. 1]; Hahn, ProceduralAdequacy in Administrative Decision Making, Pt. 2, 31 ADMIN.
L. REV. 31 (1979); see also Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 615.
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concrete policy "rules" in advance that could be applicable for all
specific allocations of its lands.8 5
Moreover, because the decisions subject to informal adjudication generally involve one party's request to gain permission to
use public lands, it is hard to deny that the procedure involves
"licensing," which the APA characterizes as a form of adjudication.1 16 Naturally, the APA's rigid dichotomy between rulemaking
and adjudication can inappropriately label procedures. 8 7 If one
views procedures functionally, they are simply mechanisms to
acquire, exchange, and manage the information that contributes
to the decision. 88
In this light, the IBLA's interpretation of the Department of
Interior's regulations can easily be explained as a recognition that
the "public interest" in "public lands" is diffuse and that procedures must facilitate access to information from these myriad interest groups. The IBLA's actions should now be reexamined to
ascertain where they may may be categorized in administrative
law theory.
185. In limited situations, land designations will provide more concrete management
criteria for the affected lands. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(recommendations for including areas in the wilderness system); id. § 1702(a) (1982) (delineations of "Areas of Critical Environmental Concern"). After a Resource Management Plan
is adopted, its terms will guide the BLM. The Endangered Species Act also provides
specific guidance: no action "likely to jeopardize the continued existence" of a listed species
may proceed without special disposition. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The BLM's lack of congressional direction may be contrasted with another agency
of the Department of Interior-the National Park Service. The Service has some ambivalence in its mandate, because tension can arise in its statutory directive that national parks
should be managed "to conserve the scenery ...and wild life therein and to provide for
the enjoyment of the same . . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (emphasis added). For the most
part, however, the Park Service need not cope with the demands of mineral developers,
loggers, graziers, and other users. Nevertheless, the individual statutes creating various
units of the park system can specifically authorize such uses. See generally Coggins, supra
note 148, at 76-77; Sax & Keiter, Glacier Park and Its Neighbors: A Study of Federal
Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 208 (1987).
Other Interior agencies similarly contrast with the BLM. The Bureau of Reclamation
is essentially a water-resource development agency although it must address environmental
concerns and manage land within its projects. Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implentation of the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263 (1976).
The Fish and Wildlife Service has an ordering criterion for its decisionmaking as to land
uses authorized within the National Wildlife Refuge System. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982 &
Supp. V 1987); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978).
186. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(9) (1982).
187. See Hahn pt. 1, supra note 184, at 469-96 (differences in activities do not justify
such a stringent dichotomy, because agency action often combines aspects of both); see
also Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 121, at 790-91.
188. See Hahn, supra note 184, at 469.
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D. Identification of the Model of Administrative Law Embraced
by the IBLA
As stated previously, two models of administrative activity
provide a theoretical basis for analysis. 89 According to the "interest representation" model of administrative law, it is the responsibility of agencies to balance divergent interests. A hallmark of
the model is therefore a simple demand that these interests be
considered in decisionmaking. "Comprehensive rationality," on
the other hand, requires a careful sifting of all alternatives to
achieve an optimal approach towards a specified goal. Unlike the
interest representation model, comprehensive rationality first requires that the decisionmaker specify what goal is sought. Although the models share some attributes, the IBLA's approach
most closely approximates an internalization of the interest representation model.
Three of the elements that contributed to the development of
this model are present in the IBLA's internalization.' 90 The first
two elements that were crucial to the model's judicial evolution
both involve entry into new decisionmaking. Courts enlarged the
types of interests allowed to participate in the administrative process not only at the judicial review stage, but also at the time the
initial agency decisions are imiade. 191 First, in interpreting the reg-

ulations governing appeals, the IBLA has allowed a decision's
"adverse affect" to be premised on injury to a diverse set of
interests, thus mirroring the broadened theories of standing that
govern access to the courts. 192 Second, the IBLA has also in189. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

190. For a listing of the four components needed for the creation of the model, see
Stewart, supra note 7, at 1716. The first three are discussed infra notes 191-202 and
accompanying text. The fourth element identified by Professor Stewart, namely the increasb

in the types of interests entitled under the due process clause to a preinfringement administrative hearing, is not as obvious. However, the IBLA does requite the BLM to develop
facts. Norman G. Lavery, 96 I.B.L.A. 294 (Mar. 31, 1987).
191, Stewart, supra note 7, at 1716, 1723-56. For other discussions of the liberalization of standing, see K. DAvis, supra note 163, § 24 (Supp. 1983) (criticizing unprincipled

decisions) 'and articles cited therein. For other discussions of the liberalization of the
requirements for intervention, see id. § 14:16 (Supp. 1980); Cramtoh, The Why, Where,
and How of Broadened PublicParticipationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.I.

525 (1971); Gellhorn, PublicParticipationin AdministrativeProceedings,81 YALE L.J. 359
(1972).
192, 43 C,F.R § 4.410 (1987); see also supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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creased the diversity of interests that may be represented in the
BLM's initial consideration.
The IBLA has accomplished the second element of the participation mandate by strictly protecting the right of "any person"
to protest. 193 The BLM must respond formally to a protest with a
decision and, at least sporadically, the IBLA has professed that
all activity on the issue must cease until the ultimate resolution of
the protest. 94 To further enhance the opportunity to participate,
the IBLA will enforce obligations to provide notice 95 or interpret
a protest as an appeal if necessary. 96 Hence, the protest is a
powerful tool for public input. The only limit the IBLA has grafted
onto the protest is that it may not be used to initiate agency
action. 97 However, the participation granted would be almost
meaningless if the BLM did not have to respond rationally to a
protestant and consider public input.
The third important element of the model is that there must
be an effective means to require adequate consideration of the
views of newly enfranchised participants.198 The courts primarily
rely on remanding a decision when an agency fails to consider
evidence or alternatives suggested by the affected interest. 99 However, enforcement of this duty most often imposes only a procedural obligation on the agency. 200 The IBLA reflects this procedural
emphasis in its espoused standard of review. Although in theory
193. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-2 (1987); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. As
indicated above, the IBLA sometimes seeks to usurp jurisdiction from the BLM in order
to preserve public input. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
197. Cascade Holistic Economic Consultants and Or. Wilderness Coalition, 58
I.B.L.A. 332 (Dec. 16, 1981); Julie Adams, 45 I.B.L.A. 252 (Feb. 4, 1980).
198. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1716, 1756-60.
199. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n,
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Scenic Hudson 1]; Office of Communications v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 425 F.2d 543, 546-47 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (agency has an
affirmative obligation to develop issues raised by intervenors); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelhaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agency must articulate
decision factors).
200. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) [hereinafter Scenic Hudson 11] (after
remand of Scenic Hudson I, the court held that the Commission adequately considered
alternatives and refused to set aside the agency's decision); see also Scalia, Responsibilities
of RegulatoryAgencies underEnvironmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. Rav. 97, 98 (1987) (noting
that actions are overturned not on the substance of the decisions, but on how the decisions
are reached).
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the IBLA could substitute its judgement for that of the BLM,201 it
repeatedly states that so long as the BLM's decision is based on

20 2
the relevant factors, the decision will be affirmed.
This technique of enhancing participation by forcing an agency

to confront alternatives predates passage of NEPA, but because

NEPA provisions bolster the need to study reasonable alternatives, its treatment is informative.20 3 In most instances where it

has reversed a decision of the BLM for failure to comply with
NEPA, the IBLA has based its reversal on the BLM's failure to

consider alternatives. 204 More importantly, NEPA itself is predominantly a procedural control on agency action: the Supreme Court
declared that NEPA does not mandate that the agency decide in
any specific substantive manner, but merely that it follow the
procedural dictates of the statute. 20 5 Nevertheless, an agency

forced to consider the effects of its decisions on diverse parties
will tend to accomodate these interests to the fullest extent pos-

sible. 20 6 Both NEPA and the generalized standard of review can
influence BLM decisions when enforced by the IBLA.
201. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 72 I.B.L.A. 218 (Apr. 25, 1983) (the
IBLA need not affirm if the decision is supported by "substantial evidence," but it may
review as fully as is permitted by the Secretary); see also supra text accompanying notes
57-64 (delineating powers of the IBLA).
202. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y, 90 I.B.L.A. 221, 232 (Jan. 30, 1986) (if all relevant
factors have been considered and are supported in the record, BLM discretion will be
affirmed); Richard J. Leaumont, 88 Interior Dec. 490, 54 I.B.L.A. 242 (Apr. 27, 1981)
(compelling evidence is needed to overturn discretionary action); In re Trailhead Timber
Sale, 97 I.B.L.A. 8 (Apr. 20, 1987) (mere difference of opinion is insufficient for reversal);
see also Southwest Resource Council, 96 I.B.L.A. 105 (Mar. 10, 1987) (standard for review
of a finding of no need to prepare an EIS, emphasizing identification and consideration of
issues).
203. NEPA requires all proposed actions which would significantly affect the environment to be accompanied by a statement detailing not only the environmental impact
but also the alternatives. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1982).
204. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n, 82 I.B.L.A. 303 (Sept. 5, 1984); Sierra Club,
80 I.B.L.A. 251 (May 2, 1984) (on judicial remand); State of Wyoming Game and Fish
Comm'n, 91 I.B.L.A. 364, 367 (Apr. 24, 1986) ("Precisely because the NEPA mandate is
primarily procedural, it is absolutely incumbent upon agencies considering activities which
may impact on the environment to assiduously fulfill obligations imposed by NEPA.").
However, IBLA has reversed BLM decisions for NEPA flaws other than a failure to
consider alternatives. See, e.g., Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance, 88 I.B.L.A. 133, 151-52
(Aug. 9, 1985) (failure to address fully the environmental impact of a proposed oil drilling
project); In re Humpy Mountain Timber Sale, 88 I.B.L.A. 7, 8-10 (June 28, 1985) (environmental impact statement filed for a timber project failed to consider site-specific impacts); In re Upper Flores Timber Sale, 86 I.B.L.A. 296, 298-99 (May 13, 1985) (failure to
revise EIS for clearcutting when large acreage is added to the initial proposal after the EIS
is prepared).
205. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980).
206. This accomodation often results in compromise. If opposing interests are before
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Many of these same changes in administrative activity are
relevant to another model of decisionmaking, the synoptic or
"comprehensive rationality" paradigm.20 7 Although most commonly applied to rulemaking, the synoptic model also affects ju208
dicial review of adjudication, especially when NEPA is involved.
This model involves identifying alternative methods of achieving
a clearly articulated goal, and comparing these in order to select
the optimal approach. Obviously, the relaxation of standing and
intervention requirements aids in the crucial identification process.
However, vigorous support of interest representation could
hamper true rationality. Undue emphasis will inure to the alternatives proposed by those concerned enough to be insistently
vocal. Moreover, comprehensive rationality might be inappropriate for the BLM's resource allocation decisions. Unless either
the agency or Congress actually identifies the values to be implemented by the decision, the first step in the paradigm is unattainable: no clear objective would exist against which alternatives may
29
be arrayed to ascertain an optimal choice.
Comprehensive rationality also has other drawbacks for settling the BLM's polycentric and multiple criteria problems. By
creating an illusion of scientific precision, the "maximizing" approach of the model could hide the political activity of value
choice. 210 Once one "right" answer is achieved, the process may
appear to be completed, and the agency would be less responsive
to changed circumstances.211 Additionally, "soft values" such as
environmental concerns often receive short shrift in these kind of
economic efficiency calculations .212
the agency, there may be a tendency to find that the "best" decision is the one which
accommodates the desires of as many interests as possible. See Cramton & Berg, On
Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the FederalBureaucracy, 71 MicH. L. Rav. 511
(1973); Friesma & Culhan, Social Impacts, Policy, and the EnvironmentalImpact Process,
16 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 339 (1976). But see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26

OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973) (NEPA not effective in improving environmental awareness).
207. See Diver, supra note 10, at 409-16.
208. Id.

209. Id. at 396.
210. Id. at 429.

211. See Shapiro, suprd note 4, at 1520; Shapiro, supra note 163, at 454-56.
212. See Teeguarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in National Forest System Planning:
Policy, Uses, and Limitations, 17 ENVTtL. L. 393, 411-16, 426-27 (1987); cf. Farber, From
Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 337 (rather than attempting to

justify environmental values, we should accept that they are emotional and part of human
nature).
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Nevertheless, the insistence on openness in decisionmaking
might be the IBLA's attempt to give at least a veneer of compre-

hensiveness, if not rationality, to the process. However, in light
of the IBLA's standard of review, it is more accurate to view the

IBLA's activities as an adoption of the interest representation
model. Moreover, this model is appropriate. In these decisions
where environmental concerns and elements of planning predominate, the issues are not those of traditional administrative law,
which emphasized vindication of private rights. Instead, a-species
of public law is present in which differing interests must be
213
harmonized.
Since divergent values clash, a core of irreconcilable differences permeates many of the BLM's tasks. The agency perhaps
can only defend its decisions by having at least addressed the
multiple interests. Hence, the IBLA's interpretations of agency
procedures to broaden public access are an understandable re214
sponse to the BLM's challenge to reconcile the irreconcilable.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated below, the adoption of the interest
representation model in its current manifestation is not without
drawbacks.
213. See Reich, supra note 156, at 1234-35.
214. This hypothesis is bolstered by looking at three additional Department of Interior agencies that have land management duties, but, due to their more explicit congressional guidance, are less schizophrenic than the BLM: the Bureau of Reclamation, the
National Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. See supra note 185. Although
SMCRA was identified as an agency-forcing statute, see supra note 162, the procedures
under it would not be a valid comparison to those governing the BLM because the IBLA
also reviews decisions under SMCRA. 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(3) (1987). Moreover, the statute
extensively mandates public participation. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(c), 1257(e), 1263,
1269(f), 1270, 1275, 1281(c) (1982).
The procedural attributes of the three selected agencies reflect the relative substantive
clarity of their governing statutes. No special appeals panels exist, and no express avenues
exist for general public input. For appeal provisions, see 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.101,426.22, 429.10
(1987) (Bureau of Reclamation); 36 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.100, 9.14, 9.49 (1987) (National Park
Service); 50 C.F.R. §§ 25.45, 36.41(b), 37.22(c) (1987) (Fish and Wildlife Service). But see
36 C.F.R. §§ 9.17, 9.52 (1987) (requiring public notice of proposed mineral development in
the National Parks); 50 C.F.R. § 29.22 (1987) (does not refer to "permittees" and thus might
allow public appeals).
These three agencies are subject to the Department of Interior's generic appeals
provision, which allows review by the Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals in
limited circumstances. 43 C.F.R. § 4.700 (1987). It is only applicable if the particular
agency's regulations permit appeals to the Secretary of the Interior. Id. The three agencies
rarely so provide. For the only examples of the applicability of the appeal provisions, see
43 C.F.R. § 21.8, 230.116 (1987). Therefore this appeal provision is not a general opportunity
for public participation and would not foster the use of the public interest model.

HarvardEnvironmentalLdw Review

[Vol. 12:465

V. DISADVANTAGES OF THE INTEREST REPRESENTATION MODEL

The IBLA's use of the interest representation model of decisionmaking creates two main drawbacks for good administration
of the public lands. First, it does not necessarily assure effective
input by all concerned members of the public. Second, especially
as employed in the BLM process, it can provide excessive power
to third party participants by giving them the ability to delay
decisions inordinately. Appreciation of these limitations is necessary in order to structure an effective appellate process.
One limitation is that the mere implementation of the interest
representation model may not result in effective input by all affected interests-there is self-selection. Only those with enough
concern, knowledge, and resources to participate will do so. 215 As
a result, representation will always be incomplete and interests
overlooked. The clamor to respond to those present could trammel
the interests of those absent.
In addition, officials of the BLM react in their decisionmaking
roles not as automatons, but as humans. To please others is a
natural human desire, and agencies, being comprised of people,
do reflect this aspect of human nature. 216 A hierarchy of players
215. See Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). The Volpe court stated:
[The plaintiff group] evidenced the seriousness of their concern with local
natural resources by organizing for the purpose of cogently expressing it, and
the intensity of their concern is apparent from the considerable expense and
effort they have undertaken in order to protect the public interest which they
believe is threatened ....
Id.; see also Burch, Who Participates-ASociological Interpretationof NaturalResource
Decisions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 48, 53 (1976) (conservationists are middle-class and
from within the system, and the technical complexity and pattern of ownership of energy
systems limits direct input by those most affected). "Public interest" groups, such as the
Sierra Club and Mountain States Legal Foundation, readily admit that they do not attempt
to present all views. See generally Stewart, supra note 7, at 1762-70; Getches, Preface:
On NaturalResources as an Area of the Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 195, 198-200 (1982);
Hassler & O'Conner, Woodsy Witchdoctors vs. JudicialGuerrillas:The Role and Impact
of CompetingInterest Groups in Environmental Litigation, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
487 (1986).
216. As Professor Cramton noted: "Critics that saddle [our democracy] with charges
of unresponsiveness are in error, for our governmental institutions are highly responsive.
But to what? The answer is obvious. They are responsive to the inputs they receive,
including the feedback that greets their action." Cramton, supra note 191, at 528-29; see
also Rabin, supra note 120, at 127-45 (arguing for a study of external influences on
decisionmaking not apparent in judicial opinions).
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can shape and channel this impulse to please. First, no one wants

to offend unduly those who could directly affect one's personal
livelihood or to whom a political obligation is owed. 2 17 Additionally, if a continuing relationship exists with a party, conflict reso-

lution and accommodation becomes more imperative than if the
other party will not be present in the future. 218 This relational

status often applies not only for the regulated industry, but for
organized interest groups as well. 2 19 Finally, even a vociferous,
one-time participant can command some of this urge to please.

Within the constraints of the hierarchy, an agency tends to acknowledge the "public interest" in a way that really best accom-

modates the desires of those the agency must please. 220 Participation may

compromised.

thus be crucial lest unrepresented

221

values be

Financial resources, however, potentially limit participation.
Although the Equal Access to Justice Act allows the award of

attorneys' fees in some litigation and administrative proceedings

222
when the government's position is not "substantially justified,"

223
it does not apply to non-hearing proceedings before the IBLA.
217. See Boyer, supra note 160, at 122-25, 141-42; Wichelman, supra note 185, at

271.
218. See generally Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources
Law: The DrifterlHabitueDistinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1986); Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 665, 661-66; Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv.95 (1974).
219. See Rodgers, supra note 218, at 202; see also id. at 198 ("It does not appear
rash to suggest that relationships with people you know or deal with over time tend to be
less strident and formal, less exploitative, more sympathetic and tolerant, and more attentive to future relations."); O'Riordan, Policy Making and Environmental Management:
Some Thoughts on Process and Research Issues, 16 NAT. REsOURCEs J.55, 61-62 (1976)
(pressure groups resemble organizations they fight; they need structure, informational
command, and leadership responsiveness of lobbies).
220. P. CULHANE, supra note 2, at 208-31; Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural
Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 219 (1974); Reich, supra note 156, at 1234-35; Sunstein,
Factions, Self Interest and the APA: FourLessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271 (1986).
221. See Culhane & Friesema, Land Use Planningfor the Public Lands, 19 NAT.
RESOURCES J.43, 51-52 (1979) (public participation undercuts "rational" decisionmaking
based on purportedly scientific "inventories" and provides the chief mechanisms for environmentalists to enter the process); Komesar, Lawyering versus Continuing Relations in
the Administrative Setting, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 751 (litigation, while imperfect, is necessary
for unrepresented interests).
222. 5 U.S.C. § 504; 15 U.S.C. § 6346; 28 U.S.C. § 2412; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
223. See Benton C. Cavin, 93 I.B.L.A. 211 (Aug. 20, 1986). But see BLM v. David
& Bonnie Ericsson, 98 I.B.L.A. 258 (July 7, 1987) (fees are available for factual hearings
because they are adversary adjudications).
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Other suggested procedures for increasing participation, such as
agency advocates and workshops, have not been implemented by
the BLM in the informal adjudicatory setting.22 4 Because the effective presentation of arguments in this forum requires expensive
expert advice--both technical and legal-the high price of "knowledge" may prevent certain interests from being adequately
represented.
Nevertheless, although expert advice might be costly for the
public to obtain, there is actually no cost barrier on access to the
IBLA. The threshold costs of appealing are minimal (literally the
price of two pages of paper and two stamps). The sole requirements for appeal are a notice and a statement of reasons, which
may be included with the notice of appeal or sent separately. These
submittals must be copied and sent to the appropriate office of the
Solicitor. 22- Therefore, liberalized standing theoretically could
overwhelm the IBLA appellate process. The typical response to
this fear-namely that increased rights of intervention and appeal
would not open floodgates because cost is an effective filter 226does not apply to the initial entry into the process. The only
constant barrier to triggering the procedural effects of an appeal
is "concern," i.e., the desire to object to a proposed BLM action.
Knowledge, in the sense of awareness of a BLM activity, may
sometimes inhibit participation. However, very often the subject
matter of an informal adjudication has been publicized by being
included in the planning process or by public hearings required by
7
NEPA.22
224. In other venues, the BLM employs formal and informal alternatives to obtain
public input. See, e.g., supra note 52. For descriptions of these informal methods, see P.
CULHANE, supra note 2, at 232-62; M. CLAWSON, supra note 45, at 247-60. For discussions
of alternative procedures, see W. BOYER, supra note 138, at 68-71; Rothstein, Presentation
of the Consumer Viewpoint in Federal Administrative Proceedings-What is the Best

Alternative?, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 565 (1980); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1791-1808; Opinion
of the Comptroller General, No. B-139703 (Dec. 3, 1976); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators
and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1096-1106 (1971).
225. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.412, 4.413 (1987); cf. J. MASHAW, supra note 176, at 261-63

(describing the swamping of the Consumer Products Safety Commission due to the requirement of response to every petition).
226. See, e.g., Office of Communication v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 359
F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson 1, 354 F.2d at 617; Note, Selection of
Administrative Intervenors: A Reappraisalof the Standing Dilemma, 42 GEO. WASH. L.

REv. 991, 1024 (1974) (intervention costs as of 1974).
227. See P. CULHANE, supra note 2, at 232-62. Public participation requirements of
the Council on Environmental Quality for NEPA are binding on all agencies. See, eg., 40
C.F.R. §§ 1502.19, 1503.1, 1506.6 (1937).
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There is a second drawback to the use of the interest representation model in its current form. Because an appeal can be
initiated with little cost, its availability can lead to inordinate power
when combined with the regulatory automatic stay provisions and
the potential for the IBLA to restrain BLM action during the
protest/appeal process. 228 The ease of blocking action can lead to
delays without improved decisionmaking because an appellant has
no need to prove even a questionable argument. A mere avowal
of displeasure with the decision without any indication of legal or
technical error by the BLM can trigger delay in the action the
BLM approved. Such a delay could be lengthy, with substantial
229
impacts for proponents of the activity.
Currently, the average substantive appeal requiring individual
analysis takes the IBLA a minimum of eighteen months, and often
two years, to complete. 230 Naturally, an appeal raises the cost of
a project, not only for the applicant seeking to use public lands, 23'
but also for the agency, because it must expend resources to
respond. Even if a decision is not stayed by an appeal, the party
authorized to use the public lands may be hesitant to proceed if
its authorization could be overturned. 2 2 Because delays can cause
project abandonment, 233 delay itself can become the goal of third
228. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
229. Cf. Gorrell & Russell, The PetitionProcessfor Designating Lands Unsuitable

for Surface Coal Mining Operations: Extreme Solution or Unnecessary Exercise?, 71 Ky.
L.J. 57, 68-71 (1982) (filing of unsupported petition under SMCRA placed coal development
in limbo for over a year); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-

07 (1978) (if a stay granted without proof was mandated by statute, due process is not
offended despite harm to a private party). But see Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation:
Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849, 851-60 (1980) (criticizing the
New Motor Vehicle Board opinion).
230. Conversation with David Hughes, Chief Counsel for the IBLA (May 24, 1988).

Cases that may be resolved on procedural issues or that are controlled by well-settled
precedent are placed on a fast track. Two-judge panels issue dispository orders in three to

four months. On the other end of the spectrum, one case decided in April of 1988 had been
at the Board for 58 months. Others were at the Board between two and four years. Id.
231. Professor Stewart argues that the "current system of administrative law wastes
resources, penalizes new investment, and discourages entry by new competitors." Stewart,
supra note 218, at 680-82; see also Ogden, Analysis of Three Current Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, ExpandingPublic Participation,and Increas-

ing Agency Accountability, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 553, 593 (1980) (providing examples of
increased cost, including that of the Storm King project, which went from $162 million to
$465 million in ten years). But see Murphy & Hoffman, Current Models for Improving
PublicRepresentation in the Administrative Process, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1976) (public

participation enhances decisionmaking and improves public confidence, although delays
and costs are increased).
232. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1247-48.

233. See, e.g., Skiffington, Federal Administrative Delay: Judicial Remedies and
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party objectors. 2 4 However, interest groups with a continuing

nexus to the area or issue might temper their tactics due to their
need to retain credibility and a smooth working relationship both
with the BLM and with industry representatives.2 35 Furthermore,
the appeal can be used as a weapon to force concessions or coerce
actions that might not be wise or necessary. 236 The mere possibility
of an appeal may disrupt the ability of the agency and the applicant
to arrive at a meaningful solution, because it could be thwarted
237
by as yet unknown dissidents.
The interest representation model as currently employed by
the IBLA is not a cure-all for unbridled agency discretion. It does
not necessarily result in the decision most beneficial to the public. 238 Underrepresentation of interests can still exist, both from
lack of knowledge of an action pending before the BLM and from
the difficulties of obtaining effective legal and scientific assistance.
More importantly, those who do not have meaningful input may
manipulate the system and create undue administrative burdens.
Therefore, some accommodation between openness and efficiency
is necessary.
Application in Natural Resources Context, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 671, 684 n.22
(1982) (examples of delays causing abandonment).
234. See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT XViii (1971) (courts should not
serve as a substitute for legislative process but as a means for increasing time to gain access
to reluctant lawmakers); Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power
Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 595 (1972) (if a decision is viewed as resolute, delay
rather than victory is the goal).
235. See Rodgers, supra note 218, at 202-03; Boyer & Meidinger, PrivatizingRegulatory Enforcement: A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen Suits under FederalEnvironmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 962 (1985). Compare Sax & Keiter, supra note
185 (federal agencies seek to accommodate each other rather than to resort to legal
pressures).
236. See Stewart, supra note 218, at 669 (once the power to delay is gained, environmentalists bargain).
237. Judicial review without effective statutes of limitation or prior participation in
the process may further frustrate useful negotiation, whether the players include just the
agency and the applicant or include public representatives as well. Cf. Park County Resources Council v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987) (NEPA
challenge to oil and gas lease issuance was not barred by exhaustion, statutory time limit
or laches).
238. See Sunstein, supra note 220 (agencies should not simply aggregate preferences
but must identify values); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1776-81 (increasing participation
emphasizes polycentric nature of task and therefore courts' deference to the substance of
discretionary decision); Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration:Alternative Strategies
for Public Choice ConcerningFederallyAided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 54-70 (1973) (participation complicates and stifles rational thought necessary for complex
problems). But see J. MASHAW, supra note 176, at 255--64 (participation is a necessary
ideal in our political society).
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The foregoing criticism is not meant to encourage the BLM
to retreat from its invitation to the public to aid in its decisionmaking. The right to participate in government is central to our
national ethic. One of our nation's truisms is that laws derive from
the consent of the governed. The Constitution itself is designed to
protect the ability of all to participate.2 39 But while the theoretical
underpinning for open decisionmaking is formidable, practical concerns, both pro and con, also must also be considered.
The first practical benefit which participation in agency action
can provide coincides with the theoretical underpinnings of such
participation. The BLM's decisions, with their attributes of planning, resemble legislation. However, the BLM acts pursuant to
statutes in which legislators did not resolve conflicts as to how the
public lands should be used. Their failure to provide guidance on
the resolution of these conflicts could lead, in effect, to a lack of
popular consent to the BLM's allocations. Public participation can
provide the opportunity for that consent.240 The legitimacy of a
decision might be questioned less if potential objectors have had
an opportunity to persuade the decisionmaker. Such an approach
resembles the "town hall" model of democracy. 24' To a greater or
lesser extent, an emotional catharsis may take place, fulfilling the
participant's need to communicate and influence his or her surroundings. 242 Allowing participation substantially affirms values
that emphasize individuality and are basic to our society. 243
239. Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode ofJudicialReview, 37 MD. L.
REV. 451 (1978).

240. Cramton, supra note 191, at 527-32.
241. Cf. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or

Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968) (no constitutional provision forbids
the ideological plaintiff, and public participation in adjudication is actually a vehicle for
self-government); see also B. ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS ACCOUNT-

ABLE 72-93 (1982) (existing mechanisms for permanent citizen input lead to a better government and an increased public confidence).
242. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); Walker, Lind &
Thibaut, The Relation Between Proceduraland DistributiveJustice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401,

1415-20 (1979) (perceptions of "fairness" increase with participation). But see Note, Public
Interest Right to Participatein FederalAdministrative Agency Proceedings: Scope and
Effect, 47 IND. L.J. 682, 688 (1972) (downplaying the cathartic effect of participation).
243. Certain commentators identify values that should determine the appropriate

amount of procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy due process in differing situations.
Many would include elements of "human dignity" and "satisfaction" as goals, which indicate
that some participation is required. See, e.g., Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes-A Pleafor "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1974); Saphire, Spec-
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Participation serves another vital function as well-it expands
the available information base. Agencies have been criticized as
only tending to search for information consistent with their own
viewpoint. 244 But even if individual BLM employees display
245
professionalism and conscientiousness to counter this tendency,
relevant information may be missed. Such data may relate to the
impacts of the proposed action on physical or sociological aspects
of the human environment, 246 or conversely, to its economic impacts on the economic viability of affected activity.2 47 Additionally,
divergent views on the BLM's legal authority under various statutes could mandate a reinterpretation of the appropriate action.
However, while broad public access to the BLM adjudicatory
process is valuable, there are practical considerations which call
for placing some restraints on public entry. 248 Although the public
must be allowed to place relevant information in the record, excessive access can paralyze the decisionmaking process. 249
Public participation in BLM informal adjudication begins with
the basic protest regulation. It allows "any person" to provide
input into "any proceeding" that is ongoing "before the Bureau." z 0
This is a completely open right of intervention, intervention being
simply "the procedure by which a third person, not originally a
party to the suit, but claiming an interest in the subject matter,
comes into the case, in order to protect his right or interpose his
claim."5 1 Therefore, intervention is clearly the issue relevant to
public participation pursuant to a protest.
ifying Due Process Values: Toward a MoreResponsive Approach to ProceduralProtection,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 117-24 (1978); J. MASHAW, supra note 176, at 162-71 (dignitary
values in a political sense include participation).
244. See Ingram, Information Channels and Environmental Decisionmaking, 13
NAT. RESOURCES J. 150 (1973); O'Riordan, supra note 219, at 62-63.

245. Many agency officials do make good faith efforts at professionalism. See supra
note 156.
246. See, e.g., Note, The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, the Freedom of In-

formation Act and the Atomic Energy Commission: The Need for Environmental Information, 47 IND. L.J. 755 (1972) (input of an individual prevented the siting of a plant at a
locale with a geological problem).
247. Professor Stewart asserts that agency concern for a "safe" environment often
ignores the economic effects of rules on industry. Stewart, supra note 218, at 667-68.
248. Multiple levels of review engendered delay and were criticized in the BLM's
pre-1970 procedures. See generally Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note 20, at 555.
249. Wilkinson, PublicParticipationin EnvironmentalManagement:A Case Study,
16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 118 (1976).

250. 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-2 (1987), discussed supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
251. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 736 (5th ed. 1979).
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Despite a tendency by courts to blur the concepts of intervention and standing to appeal an administrative decision, z25 the
two concepts are not coextensive.253 The APA does not necessarily
mandate public entry into agency adjudication. It merely provides
that "so far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an
interested person may appear before an agency ... in a proceeding
... or in connection with an agency function." 254 Whether or not

this provision grants a right of intervention or merely invites agencies to allow intervention, it clearly enables an agency to structure
the participation .2 5 Additionally, the APA envisions participation
in two distinct situations: "in a proceeding" and "in connection
'256
with an agency function.
The IBLA, however, has not recognized that the flexible doctrine of intervention should govern participation in the adjudicatory process. It invariably requires the BLM to respond to a
protest by way of a decision that at least ostensibly provides a
right to appeal to the IBLA. The IBLA then ascertains whether
the newly created "party" has been "adversely affected" and therefore is entitled to appeal. 257 The IBLA employs standing doctrines
2 58
in this interpretation, which it need not do.
Intervention has not played an extensive role in the adjudicatory process. BLM regulations only govern intervention in graz252. See National welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 732-33 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("Except for the adjustments necessary for assuring the manageability of administrative proceedings, the criteria for standing for review of agency action appear to assimilate
the criteria for standing to intervene."); Office of Communication v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Note, supra note 242, at 684-85
(the theories are often confused).
253. Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 611-16 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1052 (1979) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (bases of judicial standing doctrine render
it inapplicable to agency proceedings, which should be guided by flexible standards);
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Administrators, 81
HARV. L. REV. 721, 764-67 (1968); Comment, Public Participationin FederalAdministrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 702, 712-13 (1972).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
255. Compare Shapiro, supra note 253, at 764-67 (the APA's use of the permissive
"may" means that intervention is permitted at the agency's option) with Note, A Generic
Approach to Intervention in Administrative Proceedings-IncreasedParticipationand Efficiency through Regulatory Reform, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1427, 1446-47 (1982) ("may" gives
an interested person the election to intervene).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
257. 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(a) (1987); see also supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
258. See George Schultz, 94 I.B.L.A. 173 (Oct. 23, 1986). But see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 8:11 (1976 and Supp. 1980) (outsider appeal rights
are governed either by intervention, because the administrative action is incomplete, or by
standing).
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ing hearings. 259 Occasionally, the IBLA refers to an applicant who
has received an authorization to use the public lands as "intervening" in the adjudication of a protest to its grant. 260 Technically, the
applicant should be named as an "adverse party" in the decision
261
dismissing the protest and hence be an original party in the case.
Therefore, the IBLA's use of the term "intervenor" in these situations is inappropriate.
The IBLA has correctly applied the concept of intervention
most often in ongoing, adversarial, trial-type hearings.2 62 In so
doing, it has limited intervention as of right to those persons who
could have initiated a private contest; that is, to those with a direct
intervention, the
interest in the contested lands.2 63 For permissive
264
approach.
flexible
a
endorsed
has
IBLA
In one case, which unlike the others did not involve a hearing,
the IBLA quoted the five-part test proposed by Judge Bazelon, in
which he listed the following five factors for consideration:
1) The nature of the interest asserted by the potential
participant;
2) The relevance of this interest to the goals and purpose of
the agency;
3) The qualifications of the potential participant to represent
this interest;
4) Whether other persons could be expected to adequately
represent this interest; and
an award of
5) Whether special considerations indicate 2 that
65
standing would not be in the public interest.
This formulation resembles that of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, which also suggests that agencies employ a
259. 43 C.F.R. § 4.471 (1987).
260. See, e.g., Mark S. Altman, 93 I.B.L.A. 265 (Aug. 28, 1986).
261. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.413 (1987).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 80 Interior Dec. 538, 12
I.B.L.A. 282 (1973); United States v. United States Pumice Co., 37 I.B.L.A. 153 (Oct. 5,
1978).
263. U.S. Pumice, 37 I.B.L.A. at 156-58. Private contests are governed by 43 C.F.R.
§ 4.450-1 (1987); see also supra note 76.
264. See generally Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note 20, at 561-65 (case law
has applied a functional approach varying between amicus and full party status).
265. State of Alaska, 86 Interior Dec. 361 366 41 I.B.L.A. 315, 316 (July 25, 1979)
(quoting Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1052 (1979) (Bazelon, J., concurring)).
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balancing test that approaches intervention on a case-by-case
266

basis.
The IBLA should adopt the balancing technique more widely.
Items present in balancing tests that provide meaningful flexibility
include consideration of the prospective intervenor's interest in
the subject matter and ability to provide relevant argument and
evidence. Such a review can both broaden and narrow participation. 267 Ideological groups, whether representing industry or concerns such as the environment, could enter the process without

268
having to locate a member directly impacted by the decision.

Additionally, wider access would result for members of the public
who have cogent legal arguments, but have no injury that could
be directly and conclusively redressed by a reversal of the decision
at issue. If standing tests were employed which emphasize the
presence of an "injury in fact," the prerequisite for participation
would not be met.269 Based on the tests for intervention, the IBLA
266. See Public Participation in Administrative Hearings, Recommendation 71-6, 1
C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1987). The five factors for consideration are:
1) The nature of the contested issues;
2) The potential intervenor's interests in the subject matter;
3) The adequacy of representation provided by existent parties;
4) The ability of the prospective intervenor to present relevant evidence and
argument; and
5) The effect of intervention on an agency's implementation of its mandate.
Id. For a general background of these standards, see Gellhorn, supra note 191; Cramton,
supra note 191.
267. The IBLA used such a test to ascertain standing to appeal in State of Alaska,
86 Interior Dec. at 366, 41 I.B.L.A. at 325. However, because it found the state to have
an "interest in the land" appropriate for initiating a contest, its use neither broadened nor
tightened access. Id.; see also generally Frishberg, Hickey & Kleiler, supra note 20, at
564-65 (although use could increase participation, efficiency may arrive through control).
For more generalized considerations of the effects and desirability of basing intervention
on the participant's ability to enhance decisionmaking, see Shapiro, supra note 253, at 76467; Comment, supra note 253; MacIntyre & Volhard, Intervention in Agency Adjudication,
58 VA. L. REv. 230 (1972).
268. This would avoid difficulties often encountered in attempting to gain standing.
For the problem of generalized injury being insufficient, see Sharon Long, 83 I.B.L.A. 304,
308 (Oct. 30, 1984) (only appellants who used particular lands have standing, not an
"emotionally injured" "concerned citizen"); Mark S. Altman, 93 I.B.L.A. 265 (Aug. 28,
1986). For Supreme Court treatment of analogous situations, see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973). For the additional requirement of being within the "zone of interest" of a statute,
see Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750, 754-59 (1987). For the problems of
harassment observed in litigation when defendants seek proof of standing allegations, see
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 235, at 936-38.
269. See, e.g., Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618; Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus, 508 F. Supp.
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should assume jurisdiction; the emphasis of these tests is on
whether or not proposed intervenors can make cogent arguments
in support of a position within the agency's cognizance. Conversely, a person may be excluded if they allege use of the public
lands, and therefore an injury, but only express a preference for a
certain outcome without presenting any coherent arguments or
useful evidence.
A similar analysis of a purported appellant's ability to aid
decisionmaking perhaps has entered the IBLA's reasoning in a
surreptitious manner. Despite the IBLA's general tendency to allow participation, it dismissed certain appeals on the basis of
standing by holding that those seeking review had failed to allege
clearly an "injury." 270 Most likely, the quality of the statement of
reasons was poor, offering no additional information to the decisionmaking process. 271 Denials of participation on this basis should
be made openly pursuant to intervention theory, rather than
through strained justifications made under the standing doctrine.
To this end, the regulations controlling BLM appeals must be
modified or reinterpreted.
There is no need to change the approach taken before the
BLM renders a decision. During the time when there is actually a
proceeding pending before the BLM, all persons should have access and be able to "protest" the proposed action. However, when
the BLM dismisses a protest, it should not necessarily be by an
appealable "decision" that could invoke the automatic stay provisions. Filtering is appropriate at this juncture, which marks a
transition to the second situation for which the APA recognizes a
need for participation. Participation at this point would be "in
connection with an agency function" rather than being "in a proceeding. '272 Although both situations involve intervention questions, they do not demand uniform procedural treatment.
839, 845 (D. Wyo. 1981); Pullman v. Chorney, 509 F. Supp, 162, 166-67 (D. Colo. 1981),
aff'd, 712 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Mansfield, Relief from Express Obligations
in an Uneconomic Market: The FederalResponse and the Doctrines of Force Majeure,

Impracticability,and the Prudent Operator,22 TULSA L.J. 483, 493 n.40 (1987) (discussing
a situation with such a problem).
270. See supra note 105 (recent cases disallowing standing); see also Altman, 93
I.B.L.A. at 266.
271. See, e.g., Altman, 93 I.B.L.A. at 266 (involving extravagent allegations of injury
from the drilling of a well); cf. In re Trailhead Timber Sale, 97 I.B.L.A. 8, 9 (Apr. 20, 1987)
and cases cited therein (involving the open affirmances of BLM decisions when appellants
merely express a difference of opinion).

272. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
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If the BLM dismisses a protest and determines to act in a
manner not objected to by the directly affected party, the case
before the BLM is effectively completed. In essence, then, the
would-be "intervenor" is no longer seeking to "intervene" in an
on-going proceeding, but is seeking to initiate a new level of activity. To allow participation in this situation would thus be more
burdensome than integrating additional interests into an existing
decisionmaking framework. 273 The agency should therefore balance relevant concerns.
The potential adverse affect on the protestant need not be the
sole criterion for access to the IBLA. The unsuccessful protestant
should receive the right to request intervention before the IBLA
by petition or by a limited right of appeal that would not trigger a
stay (or would trigger only a temporary one) until the IBLA ascertains the protestant's ability to enhance the decisionmaking
process. If the protestant is denied access to the IBLA and has
met the threshold of standing for judicial review, the courts could
review the decision.
The incongruence between the availability of access to the
courts and the IBLA is not logically inconsistent, but related to
the differing duties of the two branches of government. The primary argument in favor of granting intervention rights to a person
with standing for judicial review rests in efficiency. The potential
plaintiff must have an opportunity to create a record before the
agency so that the agency itself would have an opportunity to
respond and give the court a complete picture of the controversy.
The BLM's protest regulation provides this ability.274 Therefore,

the agency may allow other elements of its duty to administer the
public lands to predominate and allow the courts to rectify any
situation that eluded IBLA review.
By adopting and enforcing the interest representation model
of administrative law, the IBLA has taken the first step in acknowl273. See Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 616 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1979) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (distinction, in practical effect,
between initiating action and contributing to ongoing proceeding influences the propriety
of participation); cf. Macrntyre & Volhard, supra note 267 (FTC's hierarchy of standing

for various levels of participation).
274. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.450-2 (1987). A beneficial side effect of emphasizing record
creation at the protest stage would be that protestants would provide sufficient information

to the BLM initially, which could convince officials to change their decision. Often, under
the current procedure, the BLM receives a generalized objection. Only when the objection
comes before the IBLA are the arguments and evidence refined.
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edging the nondirective nature of the statutes subject to the BLM's
informal adjudicatory process. Filtering the second level of public
participation should help balance desires for openness and efficiency. Nevertheless, in order for the process to be successful,
the BLM must not only listen in good faith to the concerns of
interested parties, but also help them present useful arguments by
educating the public in the nature of activities that occur on their
public lands.

